Massa, J.
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When he died, John Markey thought half of his assets would eventually pass to his son, David, pursuant to a contract to make and not revoke a mutual will John executed with his second wife, David’s stepmother. Sometime after John was gone, however, David’s stepmother breached that contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. David brought suit to enforce the contract, but the defendants prevailed on summary judgment: the trial court found that even though David’s suit was not a “claim” in probate, it was still subject to the three-month statute of limitations for a claim, relying on Keenan v. Butler, 869 N.E.2d 1284, 1290 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. not sought. We find this was error, as our General Assembly added a statutory definition of “claim” when it enacted our Probate Code in 1953, Ind. Code § 29-1-1-3(a)(2), and we interpret the plain language of that definition as including an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. We thus reverse, and we remand on the question of the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code.
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Markey argues his claim for breach of contract to make and not revoke mutual wills constitutes a “claim” as defined by our Probate Code. We agree.
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There is an exception to this three-month limit, however, stemming from the personal representative’s obligation to serve actual notice on a “creditor of the decedent . . . who is known or reasonably ascertainable.” [Footnote omitted.] Ind. Code § 29-1-7-7(d) (Supp. 2014). If the personal representative fails to serve actual notice within one month of the first published notice, the reasonably ascertainable creditor gets an additional two months to file, once he finally receives actual notice. Ind. Code § 29-1-7-7(e). But, no matter the notice date, all claims are barred nine months after the decedent’s death. Id.
So here, for David’s suit to be eligible for filing up until the nine-month bar, he must (1) have a “claim” and (2) be a reasonably ascertainable creditor.[Footenote omitted.]
Conveniently, “claims” is defined in the first chapter of the Probate Code, and it “includes liabilities of a decedent which survive, whether arising in contract or in tort or otherwise, funeral expenses, the expense of a tombstone, expenses of administration, and all taxes imposed by reason of the person’s death.” Ind. Code § 29-1-1-3(a)(2) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). That definition “appl[ies] throughout this article, unless otherwise apparent from the context.” Ind. Code § 29-1-1-3(a). Turning to the Non-claim Statute at issue here, neither its language nor context give any indication that the broad definition penned by the enacting legislature should not apply. Indeed, quite the opposite is true; the Non-claim Statute uses similarly broad language in setting forth the general limit for “all claims . . . whether founded in contract or otherwise.” Ind. Code § 29-1-14-1(a) (emphasis added). Relying on this broad definition makes sense: given the goal of swift administration, all causes of action against an estate should be subjected to shortened filing limitations laid out in the Code rather than, for instance, the ten-year statute of limitations for traditional breach of contract claims. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11 (2014).
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Conclusion
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.