Rucker, J.
… On appeal [Sampson] complains, “[t]estimony that the alleged victim showed no evidence of coaching constituted improper vouching for the alleged victim’s credibility.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] According to Sampson such testimony violates Ind. Evidence Rule 704(b) [footnote omitted] and contravenes this Court’s opinion in Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012).
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The underlying question posed by Kindred [v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied] and Archer [v. State, 996 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied] is whether the distinction between testimony that a child witness has or has not been coached and testimony that the witness did or did not exhibit any “signs or indicators” of coaching can be reconciled with the prohibition on indirect vouching this Court disapproved in Hoglund. …
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… [W]hen a jury is presented with expert testimony concerning certain coaching behaviors, the invited inference that the child has or has not been coached because the child fits the behavioral profile is likely to be just as potentially misleading as expert testimony applying the coaching behaviors to the facts of the case and declaring outright that a given child has or has not been coached. The danger of the jury misapplying this evidence thus remains the same whether an expert expresses an explicit opinion that coaching has or has not occurred or merely allows the jury to draw the final conclusion.
We conclude therefore that the subtle distinction between an expert’s testimony that a child has or has not been coached versus an expert’s testimony that the child did or did not exhibit any “signs or indicators” of coaching is insufficient to guard against the dangers that such testimony will constitute impermissible vouching as we expressed in Hoglund. Nevertheless, “once a child’s credibility is called into question proper expert testimony may be appropriate.” Steward [v. State], 652 N.E.2d [490,] 499 [(Ind. 1995)]. “[B]ehavioral characteristics of child abuse victims, even where inadmissible to prove abuse, are far less controversial when offered to rebut a claim by the defense that a child complainant’s behavior . . . is inconsistent with her claim of abuse.” Id. at 496. We thus align ourselves with those jurisdictions that permit testimony about the signs of coaching and whether a child exhibited such signs or has or has not been coached, provided the defendant has opened the door to such testimony. [Footnote omitted.]
In this case, the State introduced testimony to the effect that Wood did not observe any signs that S.B. had been coached. Although the State was careful to limit Wood’s comments to her observations of coaching indicators, this was neither in response to defense questioning, nor to rebut an express claim that S.B. had been coached. This testimony was thus improper because “indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony that the child witness is telling the truth.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1237 (footnote omitted).
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Rush, C.J., Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.
… On appeal [Sampson] complains, “[t]estimony that the alleged victim showed no evidence of coaching constituted improper vouching for the alleged victim’s credibility.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] According to Sampson such testimony violates Ind. Evidence Rule 704(b) [footnote omitted] and contravenes this Court’s opinion in Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012).
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The underlying question posed by Kindred [v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied] and Archer [v. State, 996 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied] is whether the distinction between testimony that a child witness has or has not been coached and testimony that the witness did or did not exhibit any “signs or indicators” of coaching can be reconciled with the prohibition on indirect vouching this Court disapproved in Hoglund. …
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… [W]hen a jury is presented with expert testimony concerning certain coaching behaviors, the invited inference that the child has or has not been coached because the child fits the behavioral profile is likely to be just as potentially misleading as expert testimony applying the coaching behaviors to the facts of the case and declaring outright that a given child has or has not been coached. The danger of the jury misapplying this evidence thus remains the same whether an expert expresses an explicit opinion that coaching has or has not occurred or merely allows the jury to draw the final conclusion.
We conclude therefore that the subtle distinction between an expert’s testimony that a child has or has not been coached versus an expert’s testimony that the child did or did not exhibit any “signs or indicators” of coaching is insufficient to guard against the dangers that such testimony will constitute impermissible vouching as we expressed in Hoglund. Nevertheless, “once a child’s credibility is called into question proper expert testimony may be appropriate.” Steward [v. State], 652 N.E.2d [490,] 499 [(Ind. 1995)]. “[B]ehavioral characteristics of child abuse victims, even where inadmissible to prove abuse, are far less controversial when offered to rebut a claim by the defense that a child complainant’s behavior . . . is inconsistent with her claim of abuse.” Id. at 496. We thus align ourselves with those jurisdictions that permit testimony about the signs of coaching and whether a child exhibited such signs or has or has not been coached, provided the defendant has opened the door to such testimony. [Footnote omitted.]
In this case, the State introduced testimony to the effect that Wood did not observe any signs that S.B. had been coached. Although the State was careful to limit Wood’s comments to her observations of coaching indicators, this was neither in response to defense questioning, nor to rebut an express claim that S.B. had been coached. This testimony was thus improper because “indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony that the child witness is telling the truth.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1237 (footnote omitted).
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Rush, C.J., Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.