May, J.
Gabriel Kowalskey brings this interlocutory appeal from the decision of the trial court that he, by his conduct, waived his right to counsel. Kowalskey raises two issues which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in finding that, by his conduct, he waived or forfeited his right to counsel. We reverse and remand.
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[Kowalskey’s third court-appointed attorney] Oliver indicated that Kowalskey’s February 5, 2015 letter [to the trial court] prompted his request to withdraw appearance. In the letter, Kowalskey stated that he was scheduled for a suppression hearing, that the police had denied making an investigatory stop, that he knew the police had activated their emergency lights and thus that there had been an investigatory stop, that Oliver had not attempted to contact CVS for its surveillance system footage, that without footage he could not prove the arresting officer did not make a valid investigatory stop, and that he was not asking to fire Oliver but was hoping the court would demand the prosecutor to produce or obtain the officers’ dash-cam footage or the CVS footage. At the February 9, 2015 hearing, Kowalskey stated that he did not want a different lawyer, that he did not have time to have a different lawyer, and that he was stressed and wrote the letter because his suppression hearing was scheduled for a week later. The record does not establish that Kowalskey, in sending his letter to the court, engaged in obstreperous conduct or behavior. The court did not make specific findings supporting the conclusion that Kowalskey, by his letter or otherwise, engaged in obstreperous conduct.
Moreover, … while the trial court may have informed Kowalskey at the January 6, 2015 hearing that, if he kept having problems with lawyers, it could determine that he had decided to represent himself and that “if we get to that point, . . . they’ll have to inform you of . . . the dangers of self-representation and the risks that are involved in it,” the court did not at that time or later advise Kowalskey of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. [Record citations omitted throughout]. The court’s sole statement at the January 6, 2015 hearing that “[t]he short story is [Kowalskey] would be held to the same standard as this attorney sitting right here who’s been to law school” was not an adequate advisement of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation under the circumstances. … [T]his lack of an adequate advisement of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation “weighs heavily against finding a knowing and intelligent waiver.” See Poynter [v. State], 749 N.E.2d [1122,] 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
Additionally, the court did not enter specific findings … regarding whether it had given Kowalskey the required warnings regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the extent to which Kowalskey’s behavior related to his attorneys’ requests to withdraw their appearances, his background and experience, the context of Oliver’s request to withdraw appearance and Kowalskey’s January 5, 2015 letter regarding his approaching suppression hearing, or whether Kowalskey had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel under the circumstances as required by Gilmore [v. State, 953 N.E.2d 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)]. The trial court did not undertake an analysis of whether, or make specific findings supporting the conclusion that, Kowalskey demonstrated obstreperous conduct after being warned that such conduct could result in the waiver of his right to counsel or made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel which included a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
Based upon the record, Gilmore, and Poynter, and mindful that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Kowalskey, by his conduct, waived his right to pauper counsel. See Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1124- 1128; Gilmore, 953 N.E.2d at 589-593. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
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Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Gabriel Kowalskey brings this interlocutory appeal from the decision of the trial court that he, by his conduct, waived his right to counsel. Kowalskey raises two issues which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in finding that, by his conduct, he waived or forfeited his right to counsel. We reverse and remand.
….
[Kowalskey’s third court-appointed attorney] Oliver indicated that Kowalskey’s February 5, 2015 letter [to the trial court] prompted his request to withdraw appearance. In the letter, Kowalskey stated that he was scheduled for a suppression hearing, that the police had denied making an investigatory stop, that he knew the police had activated their emergency lights and thus that there had been an investigatory stop, that Oliver had not attempted to contact CVS for its surveillance system footage, that without footage he could not prove the arresting officer did not make a valid investigatory stop, and that he was not asking to fire Oliver but was hoping the court would demand the prosecutor to produce or obtain the officers’ dash-cam footage or the CVS footage. At the February 9, 2015 hearing, Kowalskey stated that he did not want a different lawyer, that he did not have time to have a different lawyer, and that he was stressed and wrote the letter because his suppression hearing was scheduled for a week later. The record does not establish that Kowalskey, in sending his letter to the court, engaged in obstreperous conduct or behavior. The court did not make specific findings supporting the conclusion that Kowalskey, by his letter or otherwise, engaged in obstreperous conduct.
Moreover, … while the trial court may have informed Kowalskey at the January 6, 2015 hearing that, if he kept having problems with lawyers, it could determine that he had decided to represent himself and that “if we get to that point, . . . they’ll have to inform you of . . . the dangers of self-representation and the risks that are involved in it,” the court did not at that time or later advise Kowalskey of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. [Record citations omitted throughout]. The court’s sole statement at the January 6, 2015 hearing that “[t]he short story is [Kowalskey] would be held to the same standard as this attorney sitting right here who’s been to law school” was not an adequate advisement of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation under the circumstances. … [T]his lack of an adequate advisement of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation “weighs heavily against finding a knowing and intelligent waiver.” See Poynter [v. State], 749 N.E.2d [1122,] 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
Additionally, the court did not enter specific findings … regarding whether it had given Kowalskey the required warnings regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the extent to which Kowalskey’s behavior related to his attorneys’ requests to withdraw their appearances, his background and experience, the context of Oliver’s request to withdraw appearance and Kowalskey’s January 5, 2015 letter regarding his approaching suppression hearing, or whether Kowalskey had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel under the circumstances as required by Gilmore [v. State, 953 N.E.2d 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)]. The trial court did not undertake an analysis of whether, or make specific findings supporting the conclusion that, Kowalskey demonstrated obstreperous conduct after being warned that such conduct could result in the waiver of his right to counsel or made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel which included a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
Based upon the record, Gilmore, and Poynter, and mindful that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Kowalskey, by his conduct, waived his right to pauper counsel. See Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1124- 1128; Gilmore, 953 N.E.2d at 589-593. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
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Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.