Pyle, J.
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Abdullatip Osmanov (“Osmanov”), a United States permanent resident who pled guilty to a felony and a misdemeanor, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed … that he had not been advised of the risk of deportation. Before the State filed a response to the petition, the post-conviction court—relying on a written advisement and waiver of rights form and the transcript from Osmanov’s guilty plea—summarily denied Osmanov’s post-conviction petition because the advisement/waiver form contained an advisement that a felony conviction could result in the possibility of deportation and because Osmanov stated during the guilty plea hearing that he had read the advisement and discussed it with his attorney. …
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… Post-Conviction Rule 1(4) provides two different subsections under which a post-conviction court may deny a petition without a hearing— subsection (f) and subsection (g)—and that each one has a different applicable standard of review. [Citation omitted.] Subsection (f) provides that a post-conviction court “may deny the petition without further proceedings” if “the pleadings conclusively show that [the] petitioner is entitled to no relief[.]” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f) (emphasis added). Subsection (g) provides that a post-conviction court:
may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
P-C.R. 1(4)(g).
Here, the record on appeal reveals that neither party filed a motion for summary disposition or submitted affidavits or other evidence. Indeed, the parties did not even have time to do so as the post-conviction court denied Osmanov’s petition less than two weeks after he filed it and before the State had a chance to file an answer within the thirty-day response period. See P-C.R. 1(4)(a). Because neither party filed a motion for summary disposition or submitted any sort of evidence, the post-conviction court’s summary denial would not have been based on Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g). [Citations omitted.] Instead, the post-conviction court’s summary disposition would have been based on subsection (f).
“When a court disposes of a petition under subsection f, we essentially review the lower court’s decision as we would a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Allen [v. State], 791 N.E.2d [748,] 752 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied]. “The [post-conviction] court errs in disposing of a petition in this manner unless ‘the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief.’” Id. at 752-53 (quoting P-C.R. 1(4)(f)) (emphasis added). … The post-conviction court “should accept the well-pled facts as true and determine whether the post-conviction petition raises an issue of possible merit.” Id. at 756.
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Osmanov’s petition—when reviewed without considering documents outside the pleadings—pled facts that raised issues of possible merit. Thus, the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying relief on his post-conviction petition under Post–Conviction Rule 1(4)(f). Accordingly, we must reverse the post-conviction court’s summary denial and remand for further proceedings on his ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing guilty plea claims. [Citations omitted.]
Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.