Riley, J.
….
… Here, because Ennik did not renew his severance motion during the trial, the State correctly argues that he has waived the matter for appeal. See I.C. § 35-34-1-12(b) (“The right to severance of offenses or separate trial is waived by failure to renew the motion.”). … Although we … find that Ennik waived this issue for appeal by failing to renew his severance motion at trial, we will address his claim on the merits.
…. Two or more offenses may properly be joined in the same information if the offenses: “(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” I.C. § 35-34-1-9(a). … [W]here causes are joined solely under subsection 9(a)(1), i.e., same or similar character, the trial court has no discretion to deny a severance motion, and we review its decision de novo. [Citation omitted.] However, if the offenses have been joined under subsection 9(a)(2) because the defendant’s underlying acts are connected together, we review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] In this case, the trial court found that joinder was appropriate because “the nature of the offenses are of the same or similar character” and because “they are based on the same conduct and are a series of acts connected together.” [Record citation omitted.]
… In this case, Ennik maintains that although the offenses charged under Cause #003 [molesting one friend’s children] and Cause #005 [molesting another friend’s child] are of the same or similar character, they are not based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or parts of a single scheme or plan. Thus, because it was the State—not Ennik—which requested the joinder of Causes #003 and #005, Ennik posits that joinder was erroneous. And because he argues that the causes were joined only because of similar character, Ennik also claims that he was entitled to severance as a matter of right. [Footnote omitted.] We disagree.
… It is well established that offenses can “be linked by a defendant’s efforts to take advantage of his special relationship with the victims.” [Citations omitted.]
In the present case, Ennik “exploited his position” as a babysitter by molesting three young females entrusted to his care. Furthermore, Ennik’s “method was consistent.” While babysitting each of the three girls, Ennik touched their vaginas with his fingers. Each girl stated that on at least one occasion, the touching occurred while they were lying in bed in Ennik’s camper. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that joinder was proper under both subsection 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2); thus, Ennik was not entitled to severance as a matter of right.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
….
… Here, because Ennik did not renew his severance motion during the trial, the State correctly argues that he has waived the matter for appeal. See I.C. § 35-34-1-12(b) (“The right to severance of offenses or separate trial is waived by failure to renew the motion.”). … Although we … find that Ennik waived this issue for appeal by failing to renew his severance motion at trial, we will address his claim on the merits.
…. Two or more offenses may properly be joined in the same information if the offenses: “(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” I.C. § 35-34-1-9(a). … [W]here causes are joined solely under subsection 9(a)(1), i.e., same or similar character, the trial court has no discretion to deny a severance motion, and we review its decision de novo. [Citation omitted.] However, if the offenses have been joined under subsection 9(a)(2) because the defendant’s underlying acts are connected together, we review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] In this case, the trial court found that joinder was appropriate because “the nature of the offenses are of the same or similar character” and because “they are based on the same conduct and are a series of acts connected together.” [Record citation omitted.]
… In this case, Ennik maintains that although the offenses charged under Cause #003 [molesting one friend’s children] and Cause #005 [molesting another friend’s child] are of the same or similar character, they are not based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or parts of a single scheme or plan. Thus, because it was the State—not Ennik—which requested the joinder of Causes #003 and #005, Ennik posits that joinder was erroneous. And because he argues that the causes were joined only because of similar character, Ennik also claims that he was entitled to severance as a matter of right. [Footnote omitted.] We disagree.
… It is well established that offenses can “be linked by a defendant’s efforts to take advantage of his special relationship with the victims.” [Citations omitted.]
In the present case, Ennik “exploited his position” as a babysitter by molesting three young females entrusted to his care. Furthermore, Ennik’s “method was consistent.” While babysitting each of the three girls, Ennik touched their vaginas with his fingers. Each girl stated that on at least one occasion, the touching occurred while they were lying in bed in Ennik’s camper. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that joinder was proper under both subsection 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2); thus, Ennik was not entitled to severance as a matter of right.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Barnes, J., concur.