May, J.
T.M. appeals following the adoption of I.J., asserting the court erred when it denied his motions for genetic testing and to intervene in the adoption proceedings. We reverse.
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Adequacy of Ke.J.’s Consent
Adoptive Parents assert the court properly granted their petition to adopt I.J. because Mother and Ke.J. consented. As the court should not have dismissed T.M.’s motion to contest the adoption without providing T.M. an opportunity to undergo genetic testing, we cannot agree. A petition to adopt a child may not be granted unless written consents to the adoption have been obtained from:
Each living parent of a child born in wedlock, including a man who is presumed to be the child’s biological father under IC 31-14-7-1(1) if the man is the biological or adoptive parent of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(1).
Adoptive Parents claim the consent from Ke.J. was sufficient under that statute because he “is presumed to be the child’s biological father under IC 31-14-7-1(1).” Id. However their reading of the consent statute ignores the fact that consent from such a man is required “if the man is the biological or adoptive parent of the child.” Id. We may not ignore that clause. See Mertz v. Mertz, 971 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“we will attempt to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and, to that end, we read provisions of a statute together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute”), trans. denied.
Under Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-1, a man is presumed to be a child’s biological father if the man “and the child’s biological mother are or have been married to each other” and the “child is born during the marriage.” To “presume” is “to suppose to be true without proof.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/presume (last accessed April 22, 2015). Mother was married to Ke.J. when I.J. was born, so Ke.J. was presumed to be the father of I.J. See Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1(1).
Nevertheless, the presumption of fatherhood created by Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1(1) can be rebutted by “direct, clear, and convincing evidence” that someone else is the father. See Minton v. Weaver, 697 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1, mother’s husband must be found to be biological father absent evidence to rebut presumption), trans. denied. See also Green v. Estate of Green, 724 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting legal presumption of fatherhood created by marriage pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1 is rebuttable).
One method for rebutting the presumption that a mother’s husband is the father of the child is with genetic test results demonstrating greater than a 99% probability that another man is the father. See Minton, 697 N.E.2d at 1260 (factfinder erred in finding presumption of husband’s paternity had not been rebutted by genetic test results showing another man’s probability of paternity was 99.97%); see also Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1(3) (“A man is presumed to be a child’s biological father if: . . . the man undergoes a genetic test that indicated with at least a ninety-nine percent (99%) probability that the man is the child’s biological father.”).
T.M. could not produce evidence that may have rebutted the presumption that Ke.J. was the father of I.J. because the trial court denied his motion for genetic testing. The presumption that Ke.J. is the father of I.J. would have rendered valid his consent to I.J.’s adoption if no other man had come forward. But another man did come forward. T.M.’s timely registration with the putative father registry entitled him to an opportunity to challenge the presumption that Ke.J. is the father of I.J.
Conclusion
We are mindful of the fact that I.J. has been in the care, custody, and control of Adoptive Parents since birth and our reversal may create instability in her young life. But we cannot ignore the constitutional dimension of the parental right that arose with T.M.’s timely registration with the putative father registry. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., concurs. Robb, J., concurs in result with opinion.
Robb, Judge, concurring in result.
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately only to make it clear why T.M., as a third party to the marriage into which I.J. was born, has the right to intervene in this adoption and seek genetic paternity testing. It is true that Ke.J. is presumed to be I.J.’s father by operation of law because of his marriage to Mother at the time of I.J.’s birth. See slip op. at ¶ 15 (citing Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1(1)). As the majority notes, that is a rebuttable presumption. See slip op. at ¶ 16. It is also true that a man is presumed to be a child’s biological father if he undergoes a genetic test that indicates with a certain probability that he is the child’s biological father. See slip op. at ¶ 17 (citing Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1(3)). But the majority does not specifically say why the trial court erred in refusing T.M.’s request for a genetic test.
Indiana Code section 31-19-9-1(a)(1) allows a man who is presumed to be the child’s biological father because of a marital relationship to consent to an adoption only “if [he] is the biological or adoptive parent of the child.” The consent statute itself therefore grants a third party who claims to be the biological parent the right to seek genetic testing in order to rebut a husband’s presumption of paternity. If the third party is otherwise entitled to notice of the adoption, a trial court is required by statute to grant such a request.
As we have determined herein that T.M. timely registered with the putative father registry, and with the clarification that T.M. has the right to seek genetic paternity testing irrespective of Ke.J.’s presumed paternity, I concur.