David, J.
Following a jury trial, Marq Hall was convicted of class A felony child molesting. On appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel the victim’s mother to answer a deposition question about an incident in the victim’s past and in excluding from evidence a phone conversation with the victim’s mother in which they discussed the incident. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in both instances, the Court of Appeals reversed Hall’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. However, our review of the evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the conviction, leads us to conclude that the two errors, even if considered violations of Hall’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We accordingly affirm Hall’s conviction.
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First, Hall maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel A.D. to answer the certified deposition question regarding what happened between M.T. and another child when the family was living in Kentucky. According to Hall, the trial court’s ruling prevented him from obtaining information about a “prior false accusation of sexual misconduct” by M.T. and thus deprived him of the ability to fully confront his accuser under the Confrontation Clause.8 (Appellant’s Br. at 28.)
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Applying these factors to the circumstances at hand, it is apparent that the trial court’s denial of Hall’s motion to compel discovery, even if in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt…..
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Considering that three out of the five Van Arsdall factors substantially favor the State, and none favor Hall, and considering that A.D.’s potential response to his question would have neither helped nor hurt Hall, we find the trial court’s failure to compel her response harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, because the State met its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that A.D.’s potential response did not contribute to the verdict, this violation of Hall’s right of cross-examination does not require reversal. See Koenig, 933 N.E.2d at 1274 (holding trial court’s admission of laboratory report without opportunity to confront its creator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given defendant’s self-implicating statements to police); McCorker v. State, 797 N.E.2d 257, 267 (Ind. 2003) (holding any error resulting from defendant not being allowed to cross-examine State’s witness for bias harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of cross-examination defendant conducted and substantial cumulative evidence); and Standifer v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 1999) (holding defendant’s denial of opportunity to fully cross-examine State’s witnesses for bias harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given “ample evidence” introduced to support convictions).
II. Phone Call
Similarly, Hall contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by excluding his phone call with A.D. from evidence. Though the motion in limine precluded him from questioning A.D. about M.T.’s prior sexual conduct or her specific acts of dishonesty, Hall argues that the State “opened the door” to the admission of such evidence during its direct examination of A.D. and its cross examination of Hall when the prosecutor asked questions about the phone call and inquired into the information Hall wanted from A.D. [Footnote omitted.]
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In summary, given the extensive evidence of Hall’s guilt presented by the State, the likely minimal impact of the information he wanted before the jury, and the cross-examination of witnesses Hall was otherwise able to conduct, the jury’s verdict would not have been any different had the jury heard and considered Hall and A.D.’s conversation and the Kentucky incident. Consequently, we can confidently say that, on the whole record, the trial court’s twin errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Hall’s otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside.
Conclusion
Because the trial court’s alleged errors in denying Hall’s motion to compel discovery and in excluding from evidence the phone conversation between Hall and A.D., even if considered violations of Hall’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm Hall’s conviction for class A felony child molesting.
Dickson and Massa, J.J., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins.
Rucker, J., dissenting.
No matter how finely the evidence is parsed in this case, the inescapable fact is that Hall was denied his Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. At stake here is whether that denial—a clear constitutional error—was harmless. In Chapman v. California the Supreme Court declared “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Because I can make no such declaration, I respectfully dissent.
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In order to declare the error committed in Hall’s case harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court must be unequivocally convinced this error did not contribute to a guilty verdict. It seems to me incongruous for the majority to say on the one hand “the State’s line of questioning succeeded in” “elicit[ing] testimony from A.D. that Hall had baselessly inquired about M.T.’s credibility,” and “also served to mislead the jury, who had no way of knowing that Hall was in fact seeking more information about a potential prior false accusation of sexual misconduct.” Slip op. at 20-21 (footnote omitted). But then declare on the other hand “it is apparent that the trial court’s denial of Hall’s motion to compel discovery [and exclusion of the phone conversation], even if in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 14. To the contrary, the record makes clear Hall was erroneously denied his constitutional right to cross-examination. And the State has failed in its burden to demonstrate the “error did not contribute to the verdict.” Koenig, 933 N.E.2d at 1273. Accordingly I cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reed v. State, 748 N.E.2d 381 389-90 (Ind. 2001) (concluding that violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right constituted reversible error where trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel deposition testimony and refused to admit videotape of the same subject matter to impeach witness during trial). I would therefore reverse Hall’s conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.
Rush, C.J., concurs.