Baker, J.
Bryan Cox appeals from the sentence enhancement imposed as a result of his Habitual Offender1 adjudication. Cox argues that the doctrine of amelioration applies and that the habitual offender statute that became effective on July 1, 2014 should have been applied at his sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
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Cox argues that, as he was sentenced after the date that the amended habitual offender statute became effective, he should be allowed to take advantage of the more lenient amended habitual offender statute. Cox is correct that—as applied to him—the amended statute is more lenient. The habitual offender statute in force when Cox committed his crime provides that “[t]he court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is not less than the advisory sentence for the underlying offense nor more than three (3) times the advisory sentence for the underlying offense.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(h) (2013). Cox was convicted of Class B felony dealing in cocaine, a conviction that carries with it an advisory sentence of ten years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5 (2013). Therefore, the trial court was required to sentence Cox to an enhancement of at least ten years. Under the amended statute, the trial court may impose as little as six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (2014). …
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However, while Cox has shown that he was sentenced after the date of the amended statute and that the amended statute is more lenient, he cannot show that the legislature intended the doctrine to apply. In fact, the legislature has clearly shown that it did not intend the doctrine of amelioration to apply. ….
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In the instant case, Cox’s crime was committed before, and all proceedings began before, the effective date of the amended habitual offender statute. In addition, it is clear that the legislature did not intend the doctrine of amelioration to apply. Therefore, Cox’s argument fails. [Footnote omitted.]
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.