David, J.
Larry D. Russell, Jr. pleaded guilty to five counts of class C felony neglect of a dependent and two counts of class C felony criminal confinement. The plea agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court but capped Russell’s sentence at ten years “pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-1-2(c).” [Record citations omitted throughout.] …
… Upon review, it is clear that the ten-year cap in Russell’s plea agreement and the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence were based on an erroneous application of Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c) [“episode of criminal conduct” limitation on consecutive sentences]. Despite this mistake of law, we hold that Russell’s plea agreement is enforceable, because where a defendant like Russell pleads guilty knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily, and where a defendant like Russell gets the benefit of the bargain with the State when the State errs, “there is no compel[l]ing reason to set aside the conviction on grounds that the sentence is later determined to be invalid.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 39 (Ind. 2004).
….
… But to be clear, the trial court here did not impose Russell’s sentence for illegal reasons, it merely capped Russell’s sentence after misapplying Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c). The latter seems less troublesome for future similarly situated defendants.
Moreover, unlike in Berry v. State, where the trial court impermissibly went outside of the plea agreement in sentencing the defendant, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1249 (Ind. 2014), we think it significant that here the mistake was contained within the plea agreement.… Similarly, although the trial court mistakenly applied the sentencing cap of Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c), its acceptance of the ten-year plea agreement indicated its willingness to accept a deal less than consecutive maximum sentences in order to spare the victims from the ordeal of trial, ensure some amount of imprisonment for Russell, save limited judicial resources, or other valid reasons.
Because Lee requires us to uphold a sentencing provision that misstates the law, provided the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily—as Russell indisputably did, and provided that the defendant benefit from the bargain when the State errs—as Russell unequivocally does, we affirm Russell’s plea agreement, notwithstanding the mistaken application of the statutory cap contained within it.
….
Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Rush, C.J., concurs in result only.
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Massa, J., dissenting.
It would be one thing to tell the prosecution it must live with its mistaken understanding of our sentencing laws that led to its inappropriately lenient plea bargain for these monstrous crimes, particularly when the State joins the appellant in asking us to enforce its terms. A deal’s a deal, after all. But our prior holding in Lee does not compel that result—one that severely diminishes judicial review of those terms—and so, for the reasons stated below, I dissent.
….
We presume the trial court knows the law, Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ind. 2004), but when record evidence rebuts that presumption, we cannot be sure whether the trial court would have made the same decision had it actually known the law. Indeed, we just recently decided a case that raised a very similar issue. In Berry v. State, … we … noted there was no way to be sure “the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement in the first place, had it realized that it would lack authority to impose a restrictive placement on Defendant’s probation time.” Id. Thus, we remanded the case and gave the trial court the opportunity to consider afresh whether to accept or reject the plea agreement as written. Id.
That same reasoning holds true here; there is no way to be sure the trial court would have accepted Russell’s plea agreement had it known the ten-year cap was not statutorily required. Indeed, we have substantial evidence it would not have done so. The court … imposed the maximum sentence for every count to which Russell pleaded guilty, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years. [Footnote omitted.] But the trial judge capped that sentence, clearly believing his hands were tied: “However, pursuant to the limitation imposed by I.C. 35-50-1-2, defendant’s aggregate consecutive sentence is limited to ten (10) years.”
And so it follows that the remedy of Berry is appropriate here: I would reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider its approval of Russell’s plea agreement, this time based on a correct application of our sentencing laws. Any other outcome begs the question: why even have our trial judges—presumed to know the law and impartially further the interest of justice—approve such agreements?
….
All this is not to say the State couldn’t ultimately plead Russell to ten years, a grossly lenient yet perfectly legal sentence. But if such an agreement is reached and accepted by the trial court, it should be the product of an informed and honest bargaining process, and not a mistake of law. Because the outcome here was dependent upon such a mistaken understanding, apparently shared by all in the room, I respectfully dissent.
Larry D. Russell, Jr. pleaded guilty to five counts of class C felony neglect of a dependent and two counts of class C felony criminal confinement. The plea agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court but capped Russell’s sentence at ten years “pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-1-2(c).” [Record citations omitted throughout.] …
… Upon review, it is clear that the ten-year cap in Russell’s plea agreement and the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence were based on an erroneous application of Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c) [“episode of criminal conduct” limitation on consecutive sentences]. Despite this mistake of law, we hold that Russell’s plea agreement is enforceable, because where a defendant like Russell pleads guilty knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily, and where a defendant like Russell gets the benefit of the bargain with the State when the State errs, “there is no compel[l]ing reason to set aside the conviction on grounds that the sentence is later determined to be invalid.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 39 (Ind. 2004).
….
… But to be clear, the trial court here did not impose Russell’s sentence for illegal reasons, it merely capped Russell’s sentence after misapplying Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c). The latter seems less troublesome for future similarly situated defendants.
Moreover, unlike in Berry v. State, where the trial court impermissibly went outside of the plea agreement in sentencing the defendant, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1249 (Ind. 2014), we think it significant that here the mistake was contained within the plea agreement.… Similarly, although the trial court mistakenly applied the sentencing cap of Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c), its acceptance of the ten-year plea agreement indicated its willingness to accept a deal less than consecutive maximum sentences in order to spare the victims from the ordeal of trial, ensure some amount of imprisonment for Russell, save limited judicial resources, or other valid reasons.
Because Lee requires us to uphold a sentencing provision that misstates the law, provided the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily—as Russell indisputably did, and provided that the defendant benefit from the bargain when the State errs—as Russell unequivocally does, we affirm Russell’s plea agreement, notwithstanding the mistaken application of the statutory cap contained within it.
….
Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Rush, C.J., concurs in result only.
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Massa, J., dissenting.
It would be one thing to tell the prosecution it must live with its mistaken understanding of our sentencing laws that led to its inappropriately lenient plea bargain for these monstrous crimes, particularly when the State joins the appellant in asking us to enforce its terms. A deal’s a deal, after all. But our prior holding in Lee does not compel that result—one that severely diminishes judicial review of those terms—and so, for the reasons stated below, I dissent.
….
We presume the trial court knows the law, Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ind. 2004), but when record evidence rebuts that presumption, we cannot be sure whether the trial court would have made the same decision had it actually known the law. Indeed, we just recently decided a case that raised a very similar issue. In Berry v. State, … we … noted there was no way to be sure “the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement in the first place, had it realized that it would lack authority to impose a restrictive placement on Defendant’s probation time.” Id. Thus, we remanded the case and gave the trial court the opportunity to consider afresh whether to accept or reject the plea agreement as written. Id.
That same reasoning holds true here; there is no way to be sure the trial court would have accepted Russell’s plea agreement had it known the ten-year cap was not statutorily required. Indeed, we have substantial evidence it would not have done so. The court … imposed the maximum sentence for every count to which Russell pleaded guilty, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years. [Footnote omitted.] But the trial judge capped that sentence, clearly believing his hands were tied: “However, pursuant to the limitation imposed by I.C. 35-50-1-2, defendant’s aggregate consecutive sentence is limited to ten (10) years.”
And so it follows that the remedy of Berry is appropriate here: I would reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider its approval of Russell’s plea agreement, this time based on a correct application of our sentencing laws. Any other outcome begs the question: why even have our trial judges—presumed to know the law and impartially further the interest of justice—approve such agreements?
….
All this is not to say the State couldn’t ultimately plead Russell to ten years, a grossly lenient yet perfectly legal sentence. But if such an agreement is reached and accepted by the trial court, it should be the product of an informed and honest bargaining process, and not a mistake of law. Because the outcome here was dependent upon such a mistaken understanding, apparently shared by all in the room, I respectfully dissent.