Dickson, J.
This appeal challenges summary judgment in favor of a named defendant substituted in an amended complaint for a previously unknown “John Doe” defendant after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.
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Miller appeals the grant of summary judgment in Danz’s favor, arguing in part that “Rule 17(F) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure” allows the true name of a John Doe to be “inserted by amendment at any time” and that his lack of knowledge of Danz’s identity would qualify as a mistake for purposes of relation back under Trial Rule 15(C). Appellants’ Br. at i. Danz re-sponds in part that lack of knowledge of a defendant’s identity does not constitute a mistake un-der Rule 15(C).
Trial Rule 17 discusses the method of naming parties. As relevant here, it provides:
(F) Unknown persons. When the name or existence of a person is unknown, he may be named as an unknown party, and when his true name is discovered his name may be in-serted by amendment at any time.
Ind. Trial Rule 17(F) (emphases added). Trial Rule 15 governs the amendment of pleadings, providing in relevant part:
(A) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted, and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within thirty [30] days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires.
* * * *
(C) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-tempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within one hundred and twenty (120) days of commencement of the action, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits; and
(2) knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
Ind. Trial Rule 15 (emphases added).
It is undisputed that all of Miller’s claim against Danz are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) (“An action for . . . injury to person or character . . . must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.”). The parties also agree that Miller’s cause of action arose, at the latest, on March 19, 2010, the day Miller learned through a conversation with Chris Cotterill, then Chief of Staff for the Mayor of Indianapolis, that others had made statements to Cotterill that may have influenced his decision not to hire Miller. Both parties argue in part that Trial Rule 17(F) is limited by Trial Rule 15(C). We disagree.
In this matter of first impression, we find Trial Rule 15(C) does not supersede Trial Rule 17(F) nor does it apply to the “John Doe” situation before us and affirm the trial court’s judgment on the proper application of Trial Rule 17(F) alone. [Footnote omitted.] Where Trial Rule 15(C) addresses the relation back of amendments “changing the party against whom a claim is asserted,” it requires that the party to be brought in by amendment “knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.” T.R. 15(C) (emphasis added). In contrast, Trial Rule 17(C) applies where “the name or existence of a person is unknown.” T.R. 17(F) (emphasis added). Adding a new party because there has been a mistake concerning the identity of the proper defendant, i.e. a misnomer, is not akin to inserting a name for a previously unknown “John Doe” defendant. See Crossroads Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Coley, 842 N.E.2d 822, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1998); Delgado–Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 1996)) (finding relation back under Trial Rule 15(C) is permitted only “when an error has been made concerning the identity of the proper party,” not “when there is a lack of knowledge of the proper party”), trans. denied. Because there was no “mistake,” Trial Rule 15(C) has no application to the case before us. Looking at Trial Rule 17(F), we agree with Miller that the plain language of Rule 17(F) permits amendment to insert the name of a previously unknown defendant “at any time”—without any limitation. {Footnote omitted.]
….We decline to expansively interpret and apply “unknown” as used in the Rule, and thus find the circumstances of plaintiff’s probable knowledge of this defendant’s identity to have been sufficient to preclude operation of the Rule’s unlimited ex-tension of the statute of limitations.
Conclusion
Finding that the existence and identity of Kristine C. Danz was not unknown to the plain-tiff before he commenced this action, yet he waited until after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations to substitute her name for John Doe #8, we affirm summary judgment in Danz’s favor.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.