Friedlander, J.
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At the outset, we summarily reject Johnson’s contention that the trespass statute applies only for unwelcomed incursions onto real property, versus unwelcomed incursions onto leaseholds such as [the victim] Lee’s apartment in the present case. See Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
Moving now to the second argument offered in support of Johnson’s challenge to the constitutionality of this statute, he contends the statute was applied under circumstances in which he “never entered [Lee’s] apartment, never crossed her threshold or attempted to enter her apartment, and at all times remained in a common area open to the public [.]” [Record citations omitted throughout.] Johnson continues that because Lee had no possessory interest or control over the common areas of the apartment complex, the area where he was located at the time of this incident was not “the real property of another” within the meaning of I.C. § 35-43-2-2 and Lee did not have authority to order him from it.
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… After an emotional phone call, and against Lee’s expressed wishes, Johnson traveled to Lee’s apartment and said he wanted to talk to her. Lee answered the door, but would not let Johnson enter her apartment. While Johnson made an emotional appeal to talk to Lee about their relationship, Lee repeatedly told him to leave. In fact, she told Johnson to leave “[a]t least a dozen times”, but he refused to do so. During the encounter, Johnson stood in the threshold of the doorway such that Lee could not shut her door. Johnson finally left only after Lee began dialing 911. Lee had a sufficient possessory interest in her apartment door, the threshold to the door, and common area immediately adjacent to her door such as to possess authority to request that Johnson leave those areas and stop harassing her. Under these circumstances, a person of ordinary intelligence would have no difficulty determining that Lee’s behavior was prohibited by the I.C. § 35-43-2-2. See Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 262 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied]. Accordingly, Johnson’s claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him fails.
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We affirm.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.