Kirsch, J.
K.K., a juvenile, … raises one issue that we restate as: whether the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle in which K.K. was a passenger provided probable cause for officers to arrest the car’s three occupants, such that the loaded handgun found during the subsequent search of K.K. was properly admitted into evidence.
We affirm.
….
K.K. maintains that, under Indiana law, the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the car gave officers probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, but it did not give them probable cause to seize him by placing him in handcuffs and ordering him to sit on the curb. [Record citations omitted throughout.] He asserts that there “was no legitimate concern for officer safety,” and further, no marijuana was found during Officer Stewart’s search of the car, such that the officer’s claim that he smelled marijuana was pretextual and the officers were on a “fishing expedition.” [Footnote omitted.] Therefore, K.K. claims that the arrest was unlawful and anything stemming from it was fruit of the poisonous tree.
… After careful consideration, we disagree. [Footnote omitted.]
….
K.K. suggests that the Edmond [v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)] decision requires that, for probable cause to exist, the officer must not only smell marijuana emanating from the vehicle, but, in addition, the defendant driver must be alone in the vehicle when the smell is detected, and the officer must detect it on the individual’s person or breath. To the extent that Edmond could be interpreted to require the presence of all of these factors, we respectfully decline to follow it. In our view, whether the defendant is alone and whether the odor of marijuana – burnt or raw – is also present on an individual or his breath are factors to be considered in the analysis, not bright-line prerequisites necessary for probable cause to exist. … Taking into consideration the decisions discussed above, we conclude that, at the time of the arrest in this case, Officer Stewart had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal act had been or was being committed, and we find that probable cause existed to arrest the occupants of the vehicle, including K.K.
….
… Finding as we do that the arrest was supported by probable cause, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the firearm to be admitted into evidence because it was discovered pursuant to a lawful search incident to K.K.’s arrest.8
[Footnote 8: As did our colleagues in Edmond, we “caution police officers against routinely searching people stopped for traffic violations; it is not inevitable that there will always be a valid basis for doing so.” [Citation omitted.]]
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.