Robb, J.
For their participation in a 1996 robbery gone awry, Dennis Johnson and Raymond Johnson were each convicted in 1997 of felony murder and carrying a handgun without a license and sentenced to serve an aggregate term of fifty-five years. In 2013, Dennis and Raymond filed petitions to modify their respective sentences. Following a hearing in August of 2014, the trial court denied both petitions because the prosecutor did not consent to modification. In this consolidated appeal, the Johnsons contend the trial court erred in requiring the prosecutor’s consent because prior to the hearing on their petitions, the statute allowing sentence modifications was amended to remove that requirement. [Footnote omitted.] Concluding the trial court did not err in applying the prior version of the statute which required prosecutorial consent and in denying the petitions to modify on that basis, we affirm.
….
A trial court generally has no authority over a defendant after sentencing. State v. Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694, 696 (Ind. 2014). A notable exception is Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17, which gives trial courts authority under certain circumstances to modify a sentence after it is imposed. Id. From 1991 until June 30, 2014, the relevant section of the sentence modification statute read:
(b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney. . . .
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(b) (2012) (emphasis added). [Footnote omitted.]
Effective July 1, 2014, the criminal code was subject to a comprehensive revision pursuant to P.L. 158-2013 and P.L. 168-2014. The pertinent section of the sentence modification statute was amended to read:
(c) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began serving the sentence, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(c) (2014). The legislature also included a specific savings clause as part of the 2014 revision of the criminal code…. The general rule in Indiana is that “[s]tatutes are to be given prospective effect only, unless the legislature unequivocally and unambiguously intended retrospective effect as well.” State v. Pelley, 828 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ind. 2005). An exception to this general rule exists for remedial or procedural statutes. Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002). Although statutes and rules that are procedural or remedial may be applied retroactively, they are not required to be. Pelley, 828 N.E.2d at 919. Even for procedural or remedial statutes, “retroactive application is the exception, and such laws are normally to be applied prospectively absent strong and compelling reasons.” Hurst v. State, 890 N.E.2d 88, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.
….
Because the 2014 amendment to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 was neither remedial nor procedural, and because the savings clause evinces the intent of the legislature to apply the new criminal code only prospectively, the 2014 version of the sentence modification statute does not apply to the Johnsons. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that, in the absence of prosecutorial consent, it had no authority to modify the Johnsons’ sentences. The trial court’s orders denying the petitions for sentence modification are affirmed.
….
Brown, J., concurs.
Bailey, J., concurs in result with opinion.
….
Bailey, Judge.
The majority concludes that, because the recent revisions to the sentencing modification statute are neither remedial nor procedural, a prior version of the sentencing modification statute applies to the Johnsons’ petitions. I agree that the prior version of the statute applies in this case, but do so because of the time the Johnsons filed their petitions. I disagree that their dates of conviction and sentencing are controlling and therefore respectfully concur only in the result.
….
In my view, the plain language of subsection (c) of the revised statute means that, after the statute’s effective date of July 1, 2014, the prosecutor’s consent is no longer required when the trial court is asked to consider reducing or modifying a sentence that the convicted person has been serving for more than 365 days. Notably, no provision in the statute limits its application only to persons convicted or sentenced on or after July 1, 2014. Thus, under the plain meaning of the statute, I would apply the statute prospectively to all petitions for sentence modification filed on or after July 1, 2014, regardless of the petitioner’s conviction or sentencing date. After extensive discussion and analysis of relevant case law, this was the reasoning recently adopted by a majority of this panel in Moore v. State, __ N.E.3d __, No. 49A05-1408-CR-398 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015).
As it turns out, the question at issue here is one that has been presented multiple times to this Court in the last six months, producing three published opinions that conflict with Moore. [Carr v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 45A04-1409-CR-456 (Ind. Ct. App. May 12, 2015), trans. pending; Swallows v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 03A05-1412-CR-549 (Ind. Ct. App. April 30, 2015), trans. pending; Hobbs v. State, 26 N.E.3d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).]
….
For the reasons expressed in Moore and reaffirmed and expanded upon here, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues on these two theories. As to the first, I believe that when a petition for sentence modification is presented to the court, the petition date – not the conviction or sentencing date – is the critical date for determining the applicability of the statute. Second, the savings clause does not bar application of the revised statute to a petition filed after the effective date of July 1, 2014, because the revised statute, by its terms, can have no ameliorative effect on a conviction or sentence previously imposed. …
….
Finally, I observe that very recently in 2015, the General Assembly revised Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17, adding among other changes, the following language:
(a) Notwithstanding IC 1-1-5.5-21, this section applies to a person who:
(1) commits an offense; or
(2) is sentenced;
before July 1, 2014.
P.L. 164-2015 § 17(a) (effective May 5, 2015) (“the 2015 revision”). This language expressly sets aside the operation of subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the savings clause on sentence modifications. And in my view, the reference to July 1, 2014, the effective date of the 2014 revised statute (not the effective date of the newest revision), indicates that the legislative intent was always to apply the revised statute to those persons convicted and sentenced before July 1, 2014. Notably, subsection (a)(3) was not exempted in the 2015 revision. This leaves intact the provision that the revised statute does not apply to proceedings begun before July 1, 2014.
….
I would hold that the revised statute applies to all petitions filed on or after July 1, 2014, regardless of the petitioner’s conviction or sentencing date. Here, the Johnsons filed their petitions before the effective date of the statute, and thus the trial court did not err in applying the prior version of the statute and denying their petitions for lack of prosecutorial consent. Because I reach this conclusion on a different basis than the majority, I respectfully concur in the result.