Baker, J.
Gerald Kemper appeals his convictions and sentences for Robbery Resulting in Bodily Injury, a class B felony, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a class B felony, and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a class B felony. [Footnotes omitted.] Finding that the State presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kemper and Malik Abdullah conspired to commit robbery, we reverse Kemper’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. In all other respects, we affirm.
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The State argues that it presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which an agreement [to rob] could be reasonably inferred. The State points to the fact that Kemper and Abdullah arrived at the BP station in the same vehicle and that Abdullah drove Kemper away from the scene. [Record citations omitted throughout.] The State also points out that the two exchanged text messages with each other throughout the evening and that, after the crime was committed, Kemper “delivered instructions to Abdullah on how to evade capture.”
We do not believe that a reasonable jury could have inferred the existence of an agreement from this evidence. Although the State presented evidence that the two exchanged text messages on the night of the robbery, these messages indicate nothing more than that the two planned to meet. Furthermore, Kemper’s calls to Abdullah telling him to get out of the vehicle after the two had crashed into the woods [fleeing the scene of the robbery] do not tend to indicate the existence of a prior agreement. If anything, the chaotic manner in which the two escaped indicates a lack of planning and, therefore, a lack of agreement.
We also note Abdullah’s testimony that he was not aware that Kemper planned on robbing the BP station until Kemper pulled a gun out of his pocket and exited the car. This testimony was uncontradicted. The State argues that the jury was free to disregard this testimony. This is certainly true. However, while the jury was free to disregard any evidence pointing against the existence of an agreement, it was left with insufficient evidence pointing to the existence of an agreement. We find that, from the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kemper and Abdullah had agreed to rob the BP station.
The State next argues that the jury could infer that the two had agreed to commit the robbery from the fact that Abdullah pleaded guilty to the crime of conspiracy and testified that he had done so. In addition to Abdullah’s testimony, the guilty plea itself was also entered into evidence. The State argues that, once the jury was aware that Abdullah had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, “[a]ll that would have remained for the jury to answer would be the question: with whom?” Id. at 19.
This Court has previously determined that a coconspirator’s plea of guilty is not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. [Block quote omitted.] Berridge v. State, 168 Ind. App. 22, 32, 340 N.E.2d 816, 822-23 (1976)….
In this case, Abdullah’s guilty plea was entered into evidence and Abdullah was called to testify. During his testimony, Abdullah acknowledged that he had pleaded guilty to conspiracy. However, after acknowledging his plea, Abdullah did not go on to testify that he was, in fact, involved in a conspiracy. Particularly, he did not testify that he and Kemper had agreed to rob the BP station. In fact, Abdullah’s testimony indicates that there was no such agreement. Therefore, the jury was left with only Abdullah’s guilty plea, and his acknowledgment of that plea, from which to infer the existence of a conspiracy.
For the above-mentioned reasons, Abdullah’s plea of guilty cannot be considered as substantive evidence as to any element of the conspiracy charge brought against Kemper. As the remaining evidence was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kemper and Abdullah had agreed to rob the BP station, Kemper’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery while armed with a deadly weapon must be vacated. [Footnote omitted.]
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Najam, J. and Friedlander, J., concur.