Crone, J.
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Minor next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury regarding accomplice liability as it applied to attempted murder … because it failed to inform the jury that the State was required to prove that he acted with specific intent to kill when he knowingly aided, induced, or caused another person to attempt murder. See Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001) (when attempted murder is premised on accomplice liability, jury is required to be instructed that State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with specific intent to kill). We agree, and the State concedes, that the accomplice liability instruction given here was erroneous for the precise reason argued by Minor. We are left only to determine whether such error is reversible.
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… Instructional errors are considered harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence, and the instruction would not likely have impacted the jury’s verdict. Randolph v. State, 802 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Indeed, to obtain reversal on appeal based upon an erroneous jury instruction, a defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Schmid v. State, 804 N.E.2d 174, 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
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Although the jury here was instructed regarding both direct and accomplice theories of liability, this is a unique case where the erroneous accomplice liability instruction was, in fact, “mere surplusage,” and accomplice liability was not truly offered as a “distinct basis” for the jury to convict Minor for attempted murder. Rosales [v. State], 23 N.E.2d [8,] 15 [(2015)] (emphasis omitted). The evidence indicates that Minor, and his codefendant Gray, each fired multiple shots at a group of young men, seven shots coming from one of their guns and nine shots coming from the other. [The victim] testified that both Minor and Gray were firing weapons at him when he was struck and fell to the ground. Unlike in Rosales, the State made clear in its closing arguments that the specific intent to kill was required for attempted murder and that both Minor and Gray were directly liable as principals in the commission of the attempted murder of Taylor. Indeed, the State emphasized in its initial and rebuttal closing arguments that both Minor and Gray were firing at Taylor and that both possessed the specific intent to kill him. While accomplice liability was briefly mentioned by the State during closing, it is clear from our review of the record that the State was relying exclusively on the ample evidence of Minor’s liability as a principal and his specific intent to kill Taylor. [Footnote omitted.] Similarly, defense counsel’s closing arguments made clear to the jury that specific intent to kill was required for an attempted murder conviction and that accomplice liability was not at issue. Under the circumstances, Minor has failed to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction prejudiced his substantial rights, as we can safely say that no jurors voted to convict Minor of attempted murder under an accomplice liability theory absent the specific intent to kill. Therefore, we conclude that the instruction constituted harmless error.
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Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.