Dickson, J.
This appeal challenges entries of summary judgment in a medical malpractice action alleging negligence in the care and treatment of a patient during her pregnancy, resulting in the death in utero of her unborn child. We reverse the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff’s physician but affirm the grant of summary judgment for the clinic that provided her care.
….
Construing the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the patient as the non-moving party, as we must, we find the designated medical expert’s affidavit and deposition competent evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Szymanowski breached the standard of care in his treatment of Stafford. Although, as the healthcare providers point out, the record is less conclusive on which physician personally performed the disputed biophysical on November 1, reasonable inferences from Dr. Brickner’s deposition suggest that Dr. Szymanowski was the admitting physician in charge of supervising Stafford’s care that day, as the passages (in chronological order) demonstrate below. [Footnote omitted.] The first and third passages establish Dr. Szymanowski’s admit-ting/supervisory role on November 1, and the second shows equivocation only about whether Dr. Szymanowski personally performed the biophysical profile or delegated it to an ultrasound tech:
Q. Now, moving onto . . . your Affidavit, it says, “On November 1, a biophysical profile was performed which, if performed properly, should have predicted the chances of fetal survival for up to a week thereafter. . . . there is medical rea-son to believe that the biophysical profile was performed, or interpreted, improperly. Who provided care to Rebecca Stafford on November 1, 2007?
A. I believe we’ve established that it was Dr. Clemente. Dr. Clemente I believe we’ve established that. I can’t read—I can’t read—
Q. I believe we established it was Dr. Szymanowski.
A. I’m sorry, Dr. Szymanowski. It was not Dr. Clemente, it was Dr. Szymanowski. My apologies.
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, or can you tell from the record, was any other healthcare provider of GYN, Limited involved in her care on that day?
A. Not to my knowledge, no.
Q. Is it fair, then, for me to conclude that your opinions as to a breach in the standard of care on November 1st are directed to Dr. Szymanowski only?
A. At this point, yes. At this time, yes.
Deposition of Gary R. Brickner, M.D. at 87–88, Appellants’ App’x at 136.
Q. Is it your understanding that the biophysical profile was performed by Dr. Szymanowski?
A. It’s not clear from the records. I don’t know who performed it. Though he noted them, I’m not able to find any form where he was listed, other than the flow sheet.
Q. So you’re unaware if he was actually doing it or if he was doing it in conjunction . . . with an ultrasound tech?
A. I’m only aware of the results. I do not know who performed it or even when it was performed, actually. I’m assuming it was performed that day, but I’m not certain of that either.
Id. at 106, Appellants’ App’x at 141 (emphases added).
Q. Dr. Szymanowski’s care was provided on November 1st, and based upon our discussion, that’s been the focus of a lot of your criticism, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What is it about the GYN, Limited—how did GYN, Limited fail [the patient]?
A. My assumption in writing was that GYN, Limited was the umbrella organization under which these doctors practiced, so in that respect. . . . [M]y comments were directed towards the three physicians and the entity, in terms of, as a group, as an entity, they had failed to meet the standard of care. . . .
Q. You mentioned three physicians, and we have just Dr. Clemente and Dr. Szymanowski listed independently. Who is the third physician; is that Dr. Smith?
A. Yes.
Q. And Dr. Smith is not named as a defendant in this case, is he?
A. I don’t know. I mean, under GYN, Limited, I don’t know what that encompasses, whether he’s brought into the case in that way or not.
Id. at 122–24, Appellants’ App’x at 145.
The healthcare providers also point out instances where Dr. Brickner qualified his earlier statements, acknowledging, for example, that Stafford was sent home on November 1 with instructions to report any decreased fetal movement. As long as competent evidence has been designated in response to a summary judgment motion, however, “weighing [the evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—[is] a matter for trial, not summary judgment.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1005–06 (Ind. 2014). Finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr. Szymanowski’s negligence raised by the patient’s designated expert medical testimony, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for Dr. Szymanowski.
….
Conclusion
Finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Szymanowski breached the standard of care in his treatment of patient but no properly designated evidence establishing vicar-ious liability as to GYN, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for Dr. Szymanowski but affirm the grant of summary judgment for GYN. As to the claim for damages under the CWDS, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.