Pyle, J.
Statement of the Case
Appellant/Defendant, City of Fort Wayne (“the City”), files an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s grant of Appellee/Plaintiff, Katie Parrish’s (“Parrish”), motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence from her personal injury/tort claim trial regarding the fact that she was not wearing a seatbelt when a car in which she was a passenger was involved in an automobile accident. On appeal, the City argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Parrish’s motion because evidence that she was not wearing a seatbelt when she was involved in an accident involving a Fort Wayne police officer was admissible to prove that she was guilty of contributory negligence for her injuries. In support of this argument, the City claims that Parrish was negligent per se for violating Indiana’s mandatory passenger restraint act (“Seatbelt Act”). In response, Parrish argues that a violation of the Seatbelt Act cannot be used as evidence to prove fault under a theory of contributory negligence. Because we conclude that the Indiana Legislature did not clearly intend to deviate from common law when it enacted the Seatbelt Act, we agree that a violation of the Seatbelt Act may not be used to prove contributory negligence, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Parrish’s motion in limine.
We affirm.
….
…Both parties acknowledge, in light of section 7(a) of the Seatbelt Act, a person’s failure to wear a seatbelt or noncompliance with the Seatbelt Act cannot be used to prove the negligence of parties that are subject to the Comparative Fault Act. However, the City argues that, because it is not subject to the Comparative Fault Act, it may use the Seatbelt Act to prove that Parrish had a statutory duty to wear her seatbelt and, thus, was negligent per se under common law.
….
It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that where a statute is in derogation of the common law, we must construe it strictly against the expansion of liability. See Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int’l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 2001) (discussing this principle of statutory interpretation in the context of the Wrongful Death Act), reh’g denied. Accordingly, as there has not been a clear mandate from the legislature stating that seatbelt usage may be used to prove fault under the common law, we conclude that the legislature has not altered common law. Therefore, we also conclude that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in granting Parrish’s motion in limine, because her failure to use her seatbelt could not be used to prove her contributory negligence. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.