Rucker, J.
Nonetheless because sentences of life without parole are subject to this court’s mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction, we address in more detail the substance of Bell’s claims. According to Bell his statement to police was unworthy of belief because: “When Bell gave [h]is statement to police he was without counsel, had not slept the prior two days before his arrest, and was scared to death” and that “Bell was threatened with the death penalty and life without parole.” Br. of Appellant at 10. First, the record shows that before questioning, police advised Bell of his Miranda rights both orally and in writing. Ex. 179A at 12-13, 19-22, 28. Bell acknowledged his rights—including the right to counsel—and waived those rights and spoke to police. The fact that he did so “without counsel” was a decision of Bell’s own choosing. Concerning his alleged lack of sleep and being scared to death, the video recording paints a different picture. From our view, Bell appears to be alert and responsive in his interactions with the officers. See Ex. 179 at 15:53-58; 16:05-06. In like fashion Bell’s demeanor on the video recording was visible to the trial judge who was in the best position to gauge the reliability of Bell’s statement. As for an alleged “threat” we disagree with Bell’s characterization of the evidence. The record shows that during questioning one of the officers told Bell: “You know, murder’s a capital offense. People can be put to death – or they could get life with – or they could be sentenced.” Ex. 179A at 8-9 (interjection from Bell omitted). Explaining potential penalties does not constitute a “threat” that renders a confession unreliable as a matter of law. Morgan v. State, 587 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ind. 1992); see also Madison v. State, 534 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 1989) (stating an explanation of possible penalties is not an inducement rendering a confession involuntary). Further, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s mental state or condition—other than a mental state caused by police coercion—is not a factor in determining voluntariness. The factors raised by Bell—lack of counsel after waiving his right to counsel, lack of sleep, being scared—do not establish any “coercive police activity,” which the Court has said is “a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ . . . .” Id. at 167. In sum Bell’s statement to police was not unreliable as a matter of law; and standing alone was sufficient to sustain his murder conviction.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.