Baker, J.
Jonathan Grott appeals his conviction for Auto Theft, a class D felony, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. [Footnote omitted.] Finding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
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On appeal, Grott frames his argument in general terms. He argues that this is “a civil case—pure and simple” and characterizes his dispute with Enterprise as “simply a misunderstanding.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. He contends that “it was an abuse of discretion to even charge this as a criminal cause” and that “prosecutor offices [should not] be free collection attorneys to large corporations.” Id. at 4-5. On the other hand, Grott concedes that failure to return a rental car by the agreed-upon return date can, in appropriate circumstances, rise to the level of auto theft. Id. at 6.
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Therefore, although Grott was disputing the charges for the initial fifty-three-day period, the jury had evidence before it from which it could infer that Grott knew that charges from this fifty-three-day period did not entitle him to any extra days of rental after April 5, 2013. Grott signed a new written contract on April 5, 2013, and completed payment on the amount charged for the fifty-three-day period, thereby completing one contract and entering into another. Furthermore, Grott agreed to return the Cadillac on April 26, 2013, indicating that he knew his current rental agreement had expired. From this evidence, the jury could determine that Grott was not confused as to the terms of his contract with Enterprise, and that he intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the Cadillac with the intent to deprive Enterprise of its value or use, perhaps in an attempt to negotiate a reduction to his previous charges.
II. Exerting Unauthorized Control
Grott next argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he exerted unauthorized control over the Cadillac. To reiterate, “‘exert control over property’ means to obtain, take, carry, drive, lead away, conceal, abandon, sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to secure, transfer, or extend a right to property.” I.C. § 35-43-4-1. Grott maintains that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he “possessed” the Cadillac after he was told by Enterprise to stop driving it because it was merely left sitting in his open driveway after that date.
“A person who has direct and physical control over” an object “has actual possession” of it. Tate v. State, 835 N.E.2d 499, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). There is no serious dispute that Grott had direct and physical control over the vehicle at the relevant times; indeed, his whole argument on this issue is simply that Enterprise could have taken it out of his possession whenever it wanted to do so. But no one else was physically in possession of the vehicle while Grott was. That Enterprise had the authority to repossess the vehicle does not mean that Grott was not in possession of it. Thus, Grott had actual possession of the vehicle, and his argument to the contrary is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.