Najam, J.
. . . On this question of first impression, we hold that, when restitution is a condition of a juvenile’s probation, Indiana law does not require that the restitution obligation terminate upon the juvenile’s discharge from probation. Accordingly, we affirm on the merits of this appeal, but we remand with instructions that the court correct an error in one of its orders.
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. . . M.M. argues that the adult restitution statute, Section 35-50-5-3, cannot apply to him because, as a matter of law, “[p]roceedings in juvenile court are civil proceedings, not criminal in nature. An act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime.” M.R. v. State, 605 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). In contrast, the adult restitution statute is premised upon a criminal conviction. In this regard, Section 35-50-5-3 provides in relevant part:
Except as provided [elsewhere], in addition to any sentence imposed under this article for a felony or misdemeanor, the court may, as a condition of probation or without placing the person on probation, order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime, the victim’s estate, or the family of a victim who is deceased.
I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a) (emphasis added). Thus, because M.M.’s act of delinquency is not “a felony or misdemeanor,” M.M. contends that Section 35-50-5-3 does not apply to him.
. . . [W]e hold that the General Assembly did not intend that Section 35-50-5-3 not apply to a delinquent act that would be a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Thus, we agree with S.G. that Section 35-50-5-3 “is instructive when the juvenile [restitution] statute is silent.” 956 N.E.2d at 683.
Under the adult restitution statute, when restitution is made a condition of an adult’s probation the probationer is “not relieved of his obligation to make restitution when his probation end[s].” Wininger v. Purdue Univ., 666 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Indeed, Indiana Code Section 35-50-5-3(f) states that a “restitution order is not discharged by the completion of any probationary period or other sentence imposed for a felony or misdemeanor.” As we have explained:
. . .[T]he expiration of a probation period does not terminate an obligation to make restitution to a crime victim.
Unlike other conditions of probation, fines and restitution, because they can stand alone as a sentencing alternative, are considered “independent dispositions” which survive the expiration of the period of probation. People v. Bertalot, 518 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Therefore, action can be taken either during or after the probationary period to recover restitution which was made a condition of the probation. Id. . . . .
Further, our legislature has created an explicit exception to the general rule when restitution is a condition of probation. A court may order restitution either as a condition of probation or without placing the offender on probation. I.C. 35-50-5-3(a). But regardless of whether restitution is required as a condition of probation or as an independent sentence, the restitution order is not discharged by the completion of any probationary period. I.C. 35-50-5-3(f). One goal of restitution, as a condition of probation, is to compensate the aggrieved victim for monetary loss. See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law sec. 1556 (1989). The legislature could not have intended that the amount of a victim’s compensation ultimately depend upon whether a restitution order was imposed as a condition of probation or as an independent sentence. The plain language of the statute leaves no doubt that the legislature intended the victim’s compensation to be the same in either circumstance.
Id. at 457-58.
A juvenile restitution order results from an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, and, thus, it is equivalent to an adult restitution order. The rationale for not terminating a restitution obligation upon the discharge of an adult probationer from his probation applies with equal force in the juvenile context. . . . Thus, we hold that, as a matter of law, M.M’s restitution obligation did not terminate upon his discharge from probation, and we affirm the juvenile court.
Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.