Najam, J.
On October 10, 2012, Jackson pleaded guilty to neglect of a dependent, as a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Jackson to 548 days, with eighteen days executed and 530 days suspended to probation. One condition of her probation read as follows: “Violation of any law (city, state, or federal) is a violation of your probation; within forty-eight (48) hours of being arrested or charged with a new criminal offense, you must contact your Probation Officer.” Appellant’s App. at 30.
While on probation, on February 19, 2014, Jackson was arrested and charged with having committed child molesting in January 2012, before she had been sentenced and placed on probation in the instant matter. Jackson did not notify her probation officer about her arrest until thirty days later. In the meantime, on March 7, 2014, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging only that Jackson did not timely notify her probation officer about her February 19 arrest.
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We reject the State’s contention that a “new criminal offense” unambiguously includes “any crime for which one is first arrested during one’s probationary period.” Appellee’s Br. at 8. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1522 (2002), defines “new” as “having existed . . . but a short time: having originated or occurred lately: not early or long in being: RECENT[.]” (Emphasis added). Under that definition, a new criminal offense could mean an offense that comes to light for the first time during the probationary period. But it could just as reasonably mean only an offense that occurs during the probationary period, especially given the general rule that to violate one’s probation, one must perform some prohibited act, or fail to perform some required action, during the period of probation. See, e.g., C.S. v. State, 817 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In other words, conditions of probation are prospective and do not relate back to a defendant’s conduct prior to the probationary period. But under the State’s interpretation of the condition here, a prior criminal offense can be deemed a “new criminal offense.” It seems illogical for the conditions of a probation order to relate back to conduct that occurred prior to the order. Nevertheless, the condition could have been unambiguously written to require that Jackson report any arrest, even an arrest based on an “old criminal offense” that first manifests itself during the probationary period. But it was not.
Again, we construe any ambiguity against the State. See Valenzuela, 898 N.E.2d at 483. Accordingly, we construe the condition of probation at issue here to mean that Jackson was only required to notify Lovell of any arrests resulting from alleged offenses committed after she began her probation.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., dissents with separate opinion:
Although the underlying criminal actions that are alleged in the new criminal charges may have taken place prior to the date that Jackson was placed on probation in the instant matter, Jackson was not alleged to have violated the terms of her probation by committing a new criminal act. Rather, Jackson was alleged to have violated the terms of her probation by failing to comply with the requirement that she notify her probation officer within forty-eight hours of being arrested for or charged with a new criminal offense. The specific language setting forth the notice requirement, which again is separate from the requirement that one not commit a new criminal act, is not specifically limited to arrests or charges relating to criminal acts occurring after the probationary term began.