Dickson, J.
T.K. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his involuntary civil commitment. He was committed following a hearing on October 18, 2013. To obtain an involuntary regular [footnote omitted] commitment of an individual, a “petitioner is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (2012). The trial court’s order of commitment declared that, by clear and convincing evidence, T.K. was mentally ill and both dangerous and gravely disabled. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of T.K., No. 49A02-1310-MH-878, 3 N.E.3d 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014) (table), clarified on reh’g, 10 N.E.3d 100 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2014) (table). We now grant transfer and reverse.
On appeal, T.K. does not challenge the finding of his mental illness, but he contends that neither of the necessary alternative elements, “dangerous” or “gravely disabled,” were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner disagrees and argues to the contrary.
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Several recent decisions of the Court of Appeals, however, while perhaps reciting the phrase “clear and convincing,” have not applied this standard of proof in their analysis but rather have affirmed civil commitment orders merely if such an order “represents a conclusion that a reasonable person could have drawn, even if other reasonable conclusions are possible.” M.L. v. Meridian Servs., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. not sought; see also, S.T. v. Cmty. Hosp. N., 930 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. not sought; K.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 909 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. not sought; J.S. v. Ctr. for Behavioral Health, 846 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. We disapprove of this line of cases.
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Clear and convincing evidence was not presented at T.K.’s civil commitment hearing to establish that he was either dangerous or gravely disabled, and we thus hold that the civil commitment of T.K. was improper and is hereby reversed.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, JJ., concur.