Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
This case presents yet another opportunity for Indiana’s appellate courts to clarify the Indiana test for determining whether a duty exists in a negligence action, an issue that has created confusion at every level of our judiciary. There are two tests in Indiana. First, if a duty is well-established in our case law, and the case before the court is substantially similar to that case law, then that duty applies. If, on the other hand, the case before the court presents facts and circumstances that have not been addressed in prior decisions of Indiana’s appellate courts, then in determining whether a duty exists, we must balance the three factors articulated in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991), including the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured.
Here, April Goodwin, Tiffany Randolph, and Javon Washington (collectively “the Appellants”) filed a complaint against Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. (“the Bar”) alleging that the Bar was negligent when it failed to protect them from criminal acts committed by Rodney Carter on the Bar’s premises. The Bar moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted that motion following a hearing. On appeal, the Appellants raise a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the Bar.
The parties dispute whether a duty existed concerning whether the Bar could have reasonably foreseen Carter’s criminal acts. But the facts demonstrate that this is a straight-forward premises liability case, and the duty in such cases is well-established in our case law. As such, reasonable foreseeability is not part of the analysis with respect to the Bar’s duty. As this was the only argument raised to the trial court and was the basis of the court’s entry of summary judgment for the Bar, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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When supreme court precedent is in apparent conflict, as it is between Kroger and Yost, we are bound to follow the court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue. Howse v. State, 672 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Thus, we follow our supreme court’s analysis in Yost and hold that the Webb balancing test does not apply here, where the duty owed by the Bar to its invitees is well-established. In particular, the Bar owed the Appellants a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect them from foreseeable criminal attacks, and we need not make an independent judicial determination as to the existence of that duty here. Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 515; Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1052. Rather, the issue of the foreseeability of whether one patron of a bar would shoot others is more appropriately resolved as a question of fact in the context of the bar’s alleged breach of its duty. See, e.g., Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (following Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053-54).
Here, the Bar’s sole contention in its summary judgment motion was that it did not owe a duty to protect the Appellants from Carter’s criminal acts because they were not reasonably foreseeable. But, as our supreme court has held, reasonable foreseeability does not determine duty where, as here, the duty is well-established. See Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 515; Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053; Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 465. The Bar owed the Appellants a duty to protect them from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. As such, the Bar cannot satisfy its burden to affirmatively negate the duty element of the Appellants’ negligence claims. See Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. Thus, the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the Bar, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J. concur.