Barnes, J.
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Issue
The restated issue before us is whether the trial court properly refused to set aside the parties’ dissolution decree based upon an allegation that Pazouki had failed to disclose marital assets prior to the decree’s entry.
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Here, although Jahangirizadeh labeled his motion as seeking relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(3), it is clear that relief cannot be granted under that part of the Rule because the motion was filed more than one year after the original judgment was entered. However, we will proceed to consider whether the motion stated a possible independent action for fraud or invoked the trial court’s authority to set aside the judgment for fraud on the court. The Stonger opinion did not go into great detail regarding precise differences between “ordinary” fraud under Trial Rule 60(B)(3), an independent action for fraud, and fraud on the court. That is because it ultimately concluded that even if misleading evidence had been introduced before the trial court, there was no evidence that it actually influenced the trial court’s original judgment. Id. at 358-59. Here, by contrast, Jahangirizadeh’s motion to set aside adequately alleges that the trial court’s property division decision was actually influenced by Pazouki’s alleged falsification of her assets.
We do not believe that is enough, however, to establish a possible case for an independent action for fraud or fraud on the court. A number of federal court opinions and authorities have gone into significantly greater detail than Stonger regarding the differences between “ordinary” fraud, an independent action for fraud, and fraud on the court. Given the Stonger opinion’s adoption of federal authorities, we will look to those authorities as well to further delineate the differences among the three types of fraud. [Footnote omitted.]
In the Buck opinion, heavily relied upon by Stonger, the 10th Circuit addressed a motion to set aside a quiet title judgment in favor of the United States filed four years after judgment was entered; the movant alleged that government attorneys had committed fraud by failing to disclose evidence that could have altered the original judgment. Because the motion was filed past the one-year deadline of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(3), the court addressed whether an independent action for fraud or fraud on the court had been proven. The court held that it had not.
In particular, the court explained that the type of egregious fraud required to prove fraud on the court or an independent fraud action “‘is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. . . . [A]llegations of nondisclosure in pretrial discovery will not support an action for fraud on the court.’” Buck, 281 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied). Such fraud also may include “‘only the most egregious conduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated . . . .’” Id. (quoting Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1996)). “‘[N]ondisclosure of facts allegedly pertinent to the matter before [the court] . . . will not ordinarily rise to the level of fraud on the court.’” Id. Fraud on the court also requires a showing of intentional misconduct or intent to deceive or defraud the court. Id. (citing Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied).
Additionally, fraud on the court does not exist “in cases in which the wrong, if wrong there was, was only between the parties in the case and involved no direct assault on the integrity of the judicial process. Nondisclousre by a party or the party’s attorney has not been enough.” 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2870, Fraud on the Court (3rd ed. 2014). The mere possibility of a witness testifying falsely is an ordinary risk of the judicial process and is not fraud on the court, unless possibly an attorney or other officer of the court has been involved in perjury or the falsification of evidence. Id. (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 632-33 (D. D.C. 1969)). [Footnote omitted.]
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a party’s failure to furnish relevant information to an opposing party in a lawsuit does not support an independent action for fraud to set aside a judgment. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1867 (1998). Rather, the Court held that such conduct is of the type intended to be covered by Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(3), and that expanding the definition of an independent action for fraud to include such conduct would eviscerate the strict one-year time limit for motions under that Rule. Id. It also has been said that an independent action for fraud “is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2868, Independent Action for Relief (citing Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46, 118 S. Ct. at 1867).
Here, Jahangirizadeh’s allegations against Pazouki amount to a clear example of “ordinary” fraud noted in the federal authorities, involving Pazouki’s alleged nondisclosure of assets to Jahangirizadeh in order to not have them subject to division by the trial court in the dissolution decree and her alleged general unreliability as a witness. There are no allegations that Pazouki’s attorneys were involved in any intentionally fraudulent conduct. There are no allegations of any egregious conduct infringing upon the integrity of the judiciary. The only person negatively impacted by Pazouki’s allegedly fraudulent conduct is Jahangirizadeh; the public at large is not affected by the parties’ marital property division. Cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, 64 S. Ct. 997, 1001 (1944) (granting relief from judgment in patent litigation based on evidence of fraudulent scheme discovered nine years after judgment was entered and noting, “This matter does not concern only private parties. There are issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit.”). There also are no innocent third parties impacted by the property division, unlike paternity cases for example in which fraud has occurred and a child’s father has been misidentified as a result. See, e.g., In re Paternity of S.C., 966 N.E.2d 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on r’hg, trans. denied.
To the extent Pazouki may have been less-than-forthright regarding her assets—assuming Jahangirizadeh’s allegations to be true—this is the type of “ordinary” fraud that must be subject to the one-year time limit of Trial Rule 60(B)(3). Otherwise, the Rule’s time limit could be rendered a nullity in a much wider range of cases of supposed “fraud” than was intended to be covered by the Rule. Jahangirizadeh’s motion to set aside, as well as his motions to reconsider and to correct error, fail to give support to an independent action for fraud or a claim for fraud on the court. As such, the motion to set aside is barred by the one-year time limit of Trial Rule 60(B)(3).
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Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.