Bailey, J.
Also on April 25, 2014, the trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing, during which Stone admitted to the offenses pursuant to the agreement. The trial court accepted the plea agreement, entered judgments of conviction against Stone for four counts of Class B-felony Dealing in Cocaine, and ordered a presentencing investigation.
On July 2, 2014, a hearing was conducted as a result of Stone’s failure to appear for a presentencing investigation. At the beginning of the (brief) hearing, the trial court sua sponte stated, “Show the plea agreement is rejected.” (Tr. at 15.)
. . . .
While the trial court may have rejected a plea had Stone engaged in misconduct prior to his guilty plea hearing, the fact remains that Stone’s purported misconduct occurred after he had admitted to four criminal offenses in open court. What the trial court may have done with other knowledge is not relevant here, as Indiana courts have held since Reffet. 571 N.E.2d at 1230. Further, the terms of the plea agreement here did not require Stone to satisfy all the terms of his probation, or seem likely to do so, lest the plea agreement be rescinded and the State take him to a jury trial. The terms of the plea agreement make no provision for this, and accepting the State’s rationale on this point would risk rendering thousands of plea agreements void, even years later, as a result of probation violations.
The trial court lacked authority to rescind the plea agreement, vacate Stone’s convictions, and set the matter for trial. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the trial court, order it to enter judgments of conviction pursuant to the plea agreement, and to sentence Stone within the discretion afforded to it by the plea agreement.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.