Pyle, J.
Although there is not a bright line standard for determining when an arrest has occurred, the above cases demonstrate that when a police officer transports a suspect to a police station, the voluntariness of the transportation may be a significant factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred. In Buckley, where the police involuntarily transported Buckley to the police station, we concluded that a seizure had occurred. In contrast, we found that evidence of the defendants’ voluntary actions in Barber, Laster, and Faris demonstrated that the defendants had not been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The evidence of voluntary conduct in those cases included: a pre-existing relationship with law enforcement, a suspect riding in the front seat of the police vehicle, an officer giving a suspect the option to drive separately, and an officer telling a defendant he is free to leave at any time.
Here, the State argues that Officer McDaniel merely conducted an investigatory stop and not an arrest because he intended to question D.Y. but not to take D.Y. into custody to “answer for a crime.” I.C. § 35-33-1-5 (“Arrest is the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime.”). However, the above cases demonstrate that whether a seizure has occurred is dependent on whether a reasonable person would believe that “he [is] not free to leave,” rather than the police officer’s intent.
Instead, when we compare the instant case to the above cases, we conclude that Officer McDaniel’s actions amounted to a seizure of D.Y. Officer McDaniel did not ask D.Y. if he would accompany him to the station, and he did not give him the option to meet at the police station independently. Instead, he explained to D.Y. “why it [was] that [he] was there and that [he] would be transporting [D.Y.] to [IMPD’s] district roll call for some burglary investigation that he was a possible suspect in.” (Tr. 38). Based on Officer McDaniel’s language that he “would” be transporting D.Y. to district roll call, a reasonable person could have concluded that this transport was mandatory, rather than optional. (Tr. 38). This is especially true in light of D.Y.’s young age, which as the Supreme Court noted in Mendenhall, was a relevant factor. 446 U.S. at 558.
Because D.Y. was a juvenile, there was no indication that Officer McDaniel had contacted D.Y.’s parents, and Officer McDaniel did not give any indication to D.Y. that his transportation to the police station was voluntary, we conclude that Officer McDaniel did “seize” D.Y., such that he would not have felt free to leave, even though the transportation did not occur prior to the pat down. Id. at 554. As the State admits that Officer McDaniel did not have probable cause or a warrant to arrest D.Y., his seizure of D.Y. violated the Fourth Amendment, and his subsequent pat down was unlawful. Officer McDaniel therefore discovered the firearm pursuant to an unlawful search, and it was inadmissible at D.Y.’s hearing. . . . .
Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.