Riley, J.
In the present case, Shelton was not on probation at the time of the search. Rather, he was executing his sentence through his direct placement in Community Corrections’ day reporting program, which consisted of electronically-monitored home detention. . . . Accordingly, because the search of an offender on home detention invokes the same “special needs” as that of a probationer, “a lesser degree” than probable cause will satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
The United States Supreme Court has established that “[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.” Id. Thus, as succinctly stated by our own supreme court, the questions before our court “are whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that [Shelton] was engaged in criminal activity and whether there was a search condition included in his terms of [Community Corrections placement].” Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d at 6. Shelton concedes that he consented to have his house, property, and person searched as a condition to serving his sentence through Community Corrections. However, he posits that “the State failed to show that the search was reasonable.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).
We first note that there is a distinction “between the ‘reasonableness’ of a search under the Fourth Amendment and whether there was ‘reasonable suspicion’ to support a particular search.” Kopkey, 743 N.E.2d at 336. Notwithstanding the specific terms of a conditional release, all government searches must be reasonable. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d at 6. As such, the Fourth Amendment would not support “the indiscriminate ransacking of a probationer’s home at all hours, or the pumping of his or her stomach, simply because a probation term included a search condition.” Id. at 6-7. Here, we find nothing unreasonable in the search of Shelton’s property. By escorting K-9 Dixie through the house and garage to sniff for the presence of illicit drugs, Officer Flanagan’s search was completed in a timely manner and was not overly intrusive. Thus, the issue before our court is whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe that Shelton had engaged in criminal activity.
. . . .
In this case, Officer Flanagan’s investigation was initiated by an anonymous tip via Crime Stoppers. As a general rule, an anonymous tip, by itself, is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997), clarified on reh’g on other grounds. However, reasonable suspicion may be established if “significant aspects of the tip are corroborated by the police.” Id. “Such corroboration requires that an anonymous tip give the police something more than details regarding facts easily obtainable by the general public to verify its credibility.” Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. 2006). Furthermore, in order to be considered reliable, the anonymous tip “must also demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the suspect’s affairs and be able to predict future behavior.” Id.
The informant reported that Shelton had been bragging about stealing marijuana out of a police vehicle. Despite the anonymity, we find that the informant’s reliability is bolstered by the fact that he or she provided accurate information that had not been publicly disclosed. In fact, very few police officers were even aware of the theft incident. Moreover, the informant identified Shelton by name and further specified that he was on house arrest through DuComb Community Corrections. These specific details—which were independently corroborated by Officer Flanagan—indicate a personal familiarity with Shelton and his activities. Accordingly, we find that the anonymous tip exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to create reasonable suspicion for the search in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.
Vaidik, C.J. and Baker, J. concur.