David, J.
During jury selection, Weisheit challenged several potential jurors for cause based on their views of the death penalty. The trial court granted some of his challenges but denied twelve others. Using peremptory challenges to remove these prospective jurors, Weisheit exhausted all of his allotted peremptory challenges, plus an additional peremptory challenge granted by the trial court, before the last juror was seated. As a result, he had no peremptory challenges remaining when the trial court denied his final for-cause challenge and seated a juror he wanted excused. Arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to dismiss the twelve potential jurors for cause, thereby forcing him to exhaust all of his peremptory challenges in striking those potential jurors from the panel and accept a juror he did not want seated when his challenges ran out, Weisheit originally asserted that he is entitled to a new trial. Crucially, as the State points out, Weisheit does not allege that an actual juror was biased and should have been dismissed for cause.
Our recent holding in Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241 (Ind. 2014), handed down after Weisheit filed his appellate brief, is dispositive of this issue. In Oswalt, we further examined Indiana’s “exhaustion rule,” under which parties may seek appellate review of for-cause challenges to prospective jurors only if they have exhausted their peremptory challenges, as Weisheit did here. See Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 246. Ultimately, we explained that:
The exhaustion rule requires parties to peremptorily remove jurors whom the trial court refuses to strike for cause or show that they “had already exhausted [their] allotment of peremptories” at the time they request for-cause removal. [Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 30 (Ind. 2012).] And “even where a defendant preserves a claim by striking the challenged juror peremptorily,” an appellate court will find reversible error “only where the defendant eventually exhausts all peremptories and is forced to accept either an incompetent or an objectionable juror.” Id.
Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 246 (emphasis added). “A juror who qualifies for removal under . . . constitutional or statutory criteria may be removed as an ‘incompetent juror,’ while a juror ‘who is not removable for cause but whom the party wishes to strike’ peremptorily is termed ‘objectionable.’” Id. at 246 (quoting Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 30 n.7.).
Though Weisheit satisfied the exhaustion rule by exhausting his peremptory challenges, he does not establish that an “objectionable” juror served on his jury. He neither identifies which particular juror(s) were objectionable nor explains why he wished to strike the juror(s); he simply states that in expending all of his peremptory challenges, he “was forced to accept other jurors who, although not necessarily positioned to be challenged for cause, were biased against his evidence in either the guilt phase, the penalty phase, or both.” (Appellant’s Br. at 49.) Under Oswalt, his conclusory assertion that he was forced to accept biased jurors is not nearly enough for us to find reversible error. At oral argument, Weisheit conceded as much. Accordingly, Weisheit cannot demonstrate, and no longer argues, that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse twelve jurors for cause.
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On the first day evidence was heard at Weisheit’s trial, it was discovered that Juror Number 10 had delivered cookies to the jury room baked by his wife. Attached, she had taped a note that said “Thank you for your service for the family of Alyssa [and] Caleb Lynch. I will pray for you all to have strength and wisdom to deal with the days ahead. God bless!” (Court’s Ex. 1.) Upon learning of the note, the trial court and counsel for both parties convened in chambers, on the record. The trial judge stated that he wanted to bring the jurors into chambers individually and ask them whether they had seen the note. Counsel for both parties agreed to this course of action. The trial court and counsel then, on the record, questioned each juror individually about the note’s effect, if any, on them. Of the fifteen jurors and alternates, four were unaware of the note, five were aware of the note but had not read it, and the remaining six recalled that the note thanked them for their jury service. Each stated that the note had no effect on them.
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Here, Weisheit meets both of his required showings by a preponderance of the evidence, as he establishes that: (1) Juror Number 10’s wife communicated with jurors and alternate jurors without authorization via the note; (2) about the matter before the jury. Though the note did not reference the ultimate issue that the jury was called to decide—Weisheit’s guilt—the note spoke in the most general sense to the jury’s deliberations. Therefore, under Ramirez the burden shifts to the State to show that the note’s message was harmless.
We agree with the trial court that the State successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice to Weisheit from the note by showing that its contents were harmless and that the note had no influence on the jury. As the State emphasizes, over half of the jurors did not read the note, and the jurors who did read the note stated that it had no effect on their ability to serve impartially. This is unsurprising, as the note merely offered encouragement and gratitude for the jury’s no doubt difficult job ahead and made no mention of Weisheit at all. Moreover, Weisheit did not present any evidence that the jurors believed the note was an attempt to inappropriately influence them.
Thanks to the proactive efforts of the trial court of individually questioning each juror and issuing an admonishment, it was quickly determined that the note’s message would not affect the ability of the jurors and the alternate jurors to keep an open mind throughout the presentation of evidence, and the juror who brought in the note and minimized its presence was dismissed. Because Weisheit was not prejudiced by the extra-judicial communication, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny his motion for a mistrial. Nor is Weisheit entitled to a mistrial on the basis of cumulative juror impropriety, as once again under Oswalt he fails to argue that an actual juror was biased.
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Lastly, Weisheit contends that his death sentence should be vacated because neither the jury nor the trial court “gave any consideration” to the mitigating circumstances he presented. (Appellant’s Br. at 70.) The trial court’s sentencing order reflected that the aggravating circumstances “outweigh[ed] any mitigating circumstances put forth by the Defendant” but did not identify which mitigating circumstances, if any, had been considered in making that determination. (App. at 77.) To Weisheit, “[t]he failure to consider the mitigating circumstances is evidenced by the trial court’s finding that there were none.” (Appellant’s Br. at 71.)
We are unpersuaded. First, Weisheit cannot cite to any authority requiring a trier of fact to list mitigating circumstances or even provide information about its consideration of alleged mitigators.9 Our search of authority revealed just the opposite: in Pittman v. State, we stated that juries are “traditionally not required to provide reasons for their determinations,” and in entering the sentence recommended by the jury “the trial court has made an independent determination according to the trial rules that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision.” 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1254 (Ind. 2008).
Second, as the State sets forth, in both preliminary and final instructions Weisheit’s jury was thoroughly instructed to consider any mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant. More precisely, the jury was told, among other things, that a mitigating circumstance could be anything the juror believed weighed against death, that mitigating circumstances did not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jurors need not be unanimous in their determinations. Furthermore, the jury was informed of the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. Weisheit never asserted that the jury did not follow instructions. “When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they followed such instructions.” Duncanson v. State, 509 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind. 1987) (citing Tabor v. State, 461 N.E.2d 118, 125 (Ind. 1984)).
As Weisheit has failed to show otherwise, we presume the jury correctly followed instructions and considered Weisheit’s alleged mitigators. Contrary to Weisheit’s claim, simply because the jury and the trial court did not list any mitigating circumstances does not mean that they failed to consider his offered mitigators and weigh them against the four aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. Unable to cite authority invalidating the jury and trial court’s findings that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances, Weisheit makes an unavailing final argument. [Footnote omitted.]
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Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, and Massa, J.J., concur.