Sharpnack, S.J.
Statement of the Case
Attorney Richard Clem appeals the trial court’s denial of his summary judgment motion and the grant of attorney Paul Watts’ summary judgment motion following Watts’ complaint seeking judgment against Clem for attorney fees in a dissolution case.
We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Clem.
Issue
The sole issue is one of statutory interpretation and asks us to determine whether pursuant to Indiana Code section 33-43-4-2 (2004) an attorney fee lien is valid if the intention to hold a lien is filed before judgment is rendered in the case.
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First, in Indiana Code section 33-43-4-2, the legislature clearly and unambiguously stated that an attorney must enter his intention to hold a lien on the judgment “in writing upon the docket or record in which the judgment is recorded” not later than sixty days after the date the judgment is entered. This clear and unambiguous language contemplates that a judgment must be recorded before a lien may be entered.
Further, this result is consistent with our construction of the mechanic’s lien statutes. We look to statutes with similar statutory purposes for guidance. Hollingsworth, 671 N.E.2d at 167. The mechanic’s lien statute is similar to the attorney’s lien statute in that both were enacted to protect those who labor on behalf of others. Id. A person who wishes to acquire a lien upon property is required to file notice of his intention to hold the lien for the amount of the claim in the recorder’s office not later than sixty days after performing labor or furnishing materials. Ind. Code § 32-28-3-3 (2008). This sixty-day period for filing a notice of intention to hold a mechanic’s lien commences when the subcontractor “finishes task for which it was hired.” Riddle v. Newton Crane Service, Ind., 661 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Similarly, the sixty-day period for filing a notice of intention to file an attorney fee lien commences when the judgment is entered.
Conclusion
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 33-43-4-2, an attorney fee lien is not valid if the lien is filed before judgment is entered in the case. The trial court therefore erred in granting Watts’ summary judgment motion and denying Clem’s. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Clem.
Friedlander, J., and Pyle, J., concur.