Baker, J.
Jamie Thomson appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants St. Joseph Regional Medical Center and Michael Borkowski. Thomson claims to have suffered an injury to the nerves in her shoulder and arm when a board supporting her arm became detached during surgery, leaving her arm dangling towards the floor for an unknown period of time. A medical review panel determined that neither defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of care and that neither defendants’ actions were the proximate cause of Thomson’s injury. We find that, given the nature of this case, Thomson was not required to present expert testimony to rebut the panel’s conclusion as to either defendant’s failure to meet the standard of care. We also find that the expert testimony Thomson presented was sufficient to rebut the panel’s conclusion as to causation. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Thomson argues that we need not consider the relevance, or lack thereof, of Dr. Gill’s equivocations because “the fact that the arm board became detached during [her] surgery—for a long enough time for her to suffer a nerve injury—is enough to allow an inference that Dr. Borkowski breached the standard of care.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. Therefore, Thomson argues that Dr. Gill’s testimony was not needed to rebut the panel’s conclusion.
We agree with Thomson’s conclusion that expert testimony was not required in this case. This Court has previously dispensed with the need for expert opinion when a case fits within the “common knowledge” or res ipsa loquitur exception. Malooley v. McIntyre, 597 N.E.2d 314, 318-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which allows an inference of negligence to be drawn from certain surrounding facts.” Gold v. Ishak, 720 N.E.2d 1175, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The plaintiff’s evidence must include the underlying elements of res ipsa loquitur, showing that: (1) the injuring instrumentality is under the management or exclusive control of the defendant or his servants and (2) the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management of the injuring instrumentality use proper care. Id. at 1181.
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Dr. Borkowski argues that Thomson cannot rely upon common sense and experience in this case because “[a] lay person does not know the mechanics of [arm] positioning during an operation” or “how an arm board is attached to a surgical bed.” Appellee’s Br. p. 24. This may be, however, a lay person does not need to know the precise contours of arm positioning during surgery to understand that an arm should not be left dangling towards the floor. As for how the board became detached, Dr. Borkowski does not argue that this incident was something that could ordinarily be expected to happen in the course of surgery. Therefore, it suffices to say that common sense and experience lead us to conclude that an arm board should not become detached leaving a patient’s arm dangling for such a period of time that the patient suffers nerve injury.
We reiterate that res ipsa loquitur only allows for an inference of negligence. Cleary v. Manning, 884 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We have not found conclusively that Dr. Borkowski or SJRMC were negligent nor have we found conclusively that either failed to meet the standard of care. Both defendants are free to present evidence and argue all issues before the trier of fact. Id. Our finding that the res ipsa loquitur exception applies in this case means only that expert testimony was not needed to rebut the panel’s conclusion and summary judgment was inappropriate. [Footnote omitted.]
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.