David, J.
On September 17, 2012, counsel for Study filed a Motion to Dismiss Count XI on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations provided in Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2 (2014). A hearing was held, and Study argued that the State’s charging information did not demonstrate on its face why the charge was not barred by the five-year statute of limitations. 4 [4 If the State is relying upon the concealment-tolling provision, “courts have required the State to plead those circumstances [of concealment] in the information so that a defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to rely and may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.” Willner v. State, 602 N.E.2d 507, 508-09 (Ind. 1992) (citing Jones v. State, 14 Ind. 120, 121 (1860)).] The trial court granted Study’s motion to dismiss Count XI as it was originally charged, but later granted the State leave to file an amended charging information. The amended charge for Count XI indicated that Study had concealed evidence of the charged offense, which constitutes an exception to Indiana’s statute of limitations under Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(2). Under the concealment-tolling provision, the State argued the statute of limitations was tolled until November 21, 2007 when Study was apprehended, which would allow the State until November 21, 2012 to bring the charge against him.
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The Court of Appeals looked to Sloan and determined that the proper reading of the statute does allow for the five-year limitations period to be “tolled by a defendant’s concealment of any evidence, including evidence of guilt.” Study, No. 06A04-1308-CR-391, Slip Op. at *9. The State’s amended charging information provided that Study concealed evidence of: 1) his identity by wearing a mask during the offense; 2) the vehicle that he used to drive away after the robbery; 3) the trash can used during the robbery that he took from the bank; 4) clothing he wore during the robbery; 5) personal property taken from a victim; 6) the weapon used during the commission of the offense; and 7) evidence relating to other robberies which displayed a common modus operandi as the March 21, 2006 robbery. Based upon its interpretation of the concealment-tolling provision, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Study’s motion to dismiss the March 21, 2006 robbery charge. Study, No. 06A04-1308-CR-391, Slip Op. at *10.
However, Judge Mathias’ dissent explains that Indiana courts have long held that the phrase “conceals evidence of the offense” requires that the statute of limitations should not be tolled unless the defendant takes a positive act which is calculated to conceal evidence that a crime has been committed. Study, No. 06A04-1308-CR-391, Slip Op. at *15 (citing Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) requires “a positive act performed by the defendant calculated to prevent discovery of the fact that a crime has been committed” and “concealment of guilt is not concealment of the fact that an offense has been committed”)) (string citation omitted). Despite the question we raised in Sloan, we are not persuaded to depart from the long-recognized reading of the concealment-tolling provision.
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As in Umfleet, a positive act of concealment never occurred at all in the case before us today. Here, the State argues that concealment of any evidence of guilt tolls the statute of limitations. The charging information alleges that concealment occurred when Study concealed his identity by wearing a mask, and concealed the getaway car, clothes worn during the crime, items taken from a victim, the weapon used, and evidence linking the robbery to other robberies. None of these actions would serve to prevent law enforcement from discovering that a bank had been robbed. The State’s ability to investigate the crime and develop a case was not thwarted. Interpretation of the statute of limitations requires balancing the defendant’s interest in being timely prosecuted and the State’s interest in having sufficient time to investigate and build a case. See Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 920. Here, the robbery occurred on March 21, 2006. Law enforcement officials discovered the robbery and were able to begin investigating immediately. Therefore, the State’s interest was sufficiently served as there was nothing delaying their ability to investigate.
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The application of the concealment-tolling provision under Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(2) requires a positive act by the defendant that is calculated to conceal the fact that a crime has been committed. Study did not engage in any positive act calculated to conceal the fact that a robbery occurred on March 21, 2006. Therefore, the statute of limitations as to that offense was not tolled, and the charge should have been dismissed. We remand for the trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence for Count XI and dismiss the charge. . . . .
Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, Massa, J.J., concur.