Barnes, J.
Case Summary
J.K. appeals the trial court’s entry of a protective order against him. We reverse.
Issue
J.K. raises two issues. We address only whether there is sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the protective order.
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In light of the language of the CPOA and our recent pronouncement in A.N., we do not believe the legislature intended that protective orders can be reissued, renewed, or extended ad infinitum based solely upon evidence related to the protective order’s initial issuance, contrary to the trial court’s belief. Rather, any such reissuance, renewal, or extension must be based upon evidence that a protective order currently is “necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence” because of a continuing threat of harm. Moreover, the statute provides for a presumptive length of two years for a protective order, indicating that the legislature did not intend for such orders to be indefinite, absent evidence indicating that a length of more than two years is required by the facts and circumstances of a particular case. [Footnote omitted.]
We also conclude it is clear from the CPOA that a petitioner who seeks either re-issuance of a protective order that has expired, or modification of an unexpired protective order, bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a new protective order or extension of an existing order is required. Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9 applies to both original issuances and modifications of protective orders, and subsection (f) of the statute squarely places the burden of proof on a petitioner…..
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We reverse the issuance of the protective order against J.K. for insufficient evidence.
Reversed.
MAY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.