David, J.
The State charged Cleary with five criminal charges and three infractions, all flowing from the November 4, 2010, collision:
Count I: Causing death when operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.15, a class B felony. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(b) (2010).
Count II: Causing death when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, a class C felony. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a).
Count III: Operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.15, a class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b) (2010).
Count IV: Operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a manner endangering a person, a class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (2010).
Count V: Operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, a class C misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).
Count VI: Failure to yield to a recovery vehicle, a class A infraction. Ind. Code §§ 9-21-8-35(c) (2010), 9-21-8-54(a) (2010).
Count VII: Improper lane movement, a class C infraction. Ind. Code §§ 9-21-8-11 (2010), 9-21-8-49 (2010).
Count VIII: Possessing more than one driver’s license, a class C infraction. Ind. Code §§ 9-24-11-4(a) (2010), 9-24-11-8(a) (2010).
Cleary went to trial on all eight counts, and on December 14, 2011, a jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts IV and V, and found Cleary had committed the infractions alleged in Counts VI and VII. It deadlocked, however, on Counts I, II, and III.
The State did not move for a judgment on the verdicts, but Cleary did. The trial court allowed Cleary and the State until January 12, 2012, to submit briefs on the issue. It held a hearing on January 30, 2012, after which it denied Cleary’s motion to compel an entry of judgment on the verdicts. It permitted the State to retry Cleary on all eight counts and set the second trial for August 27, 2012.
Cleary’s second jury found him guilty of Counts I through V and liable for Counts VI and VII. [Footnote omitted.] The State moved for judgments on the verdicts as to Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII, and the trial court entered judgments of convictions as to those counts only. . . . .
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We begin with Cleary’s statutory claim. Cleary says that the Indiana Code required the trial judge here to enter judgments of conviction on the first jury’s guilty verdicts, and if it had done so then those convictions would have statutorily prohibited his retrial on the same offenses. Additionally, he says those convictions would have implied acquittals in the charges for which his jury deadlocked, meaning the State could not retry those deadlocked charges, either. The Court of Appeals has previously resolved this very issue, in a way that rejects Cleary’s view of how the statutes operate. This Court has not squarely addressed the question until today, but we likewise find Cleary’s application of the statutes to be incorrect.
Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3 (2008) codifies protections against being placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense. It provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prosecution is barred if there was a former prosecution of the defendant based on the same facts and for commission of the same offense and if: (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the defendant.” Ind. Code § 35-41-4-3(a). It also incorporates an “implied acquittal” principle by providing that “[a] conviction of an included offense constitutes an acquittal of the greater offense, even if the conviction is subsequently set aside.” Ind. Code § 35-41-4-3(a)(1); Haddix v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Cleary’s first jury reached a verdict of guilty on the lesser-included OWI misdemeanors—those charges not requiring proof that Cleary caused Amsden’s death or proof of a BAC greater than 0.15—and it deadlocked on the greater offenses. It is unequivocal that if the trial court had entered a judgment of conviction for those lesser-included misdemeanors, Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3(a) would have barred the State from retrying Cleary on Counts I, II, and III.
But “a guilty verdict and a judgment of conviction are two rather different things.” Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778, 779 (Ind. 2001). They are “different acts from which different consequences flow.” Id. at 780. “A verdict of guilty can certainly be a significant legal event, but only if a court later enters judgment on it.” Id. Thus, the jury’s guilty verdicts here are not inherently the same as “an acquittal or a conviction” such that Ind. Code § 35-41-4-3(a) necessarily applies. Similarly, they are not “conviction[s] of an included offense” such that the implied acquittal provision, by its terms, bars retrial on the greater offenses.
Cleary seeks the protection of this section regardless of the distinction between convictions and verdicts, because he says the trial court was compelled to enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser-included offenses pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-1-1. [Footnote omitted.] But that provision does not require a judgment be entered when a new trial is granted. So essentially, Cleary’s argument is that the jury’s guilty verdicts on Counts IV and V were implied acquittals of Counts I, II, and III, therefore his retrial was barred on those greater offenses, and the trial court was required to enter the judgments of conviction on Counts IV and V. We reject Cleary’s claim and conclude that a retrial was permissible in his case.
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. . . [F]or the reasons expressed below we agree with the Haddix panel’s conclusion that Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3(a)’s implied acquittal provision does not apply when the jury returns a guilty verdict on a lesser-included offense but deadlocks on the greater charge. The doctrine arose in response to much different circumstances. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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But significantly, neither Green nor Price involved juries that were hung on the greater offense. Rather, the juries in those cases were silent as to their verdicts on the greater charges. See Id. at 324 (“The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included crime of voluntary manslaughter . . . The jury’s verdict made no reference to the charge of murder.”) (emphasis added); Green, 355 U.S. at 186 (“The jury found Green guilty of arson and of second degree murder but did not find him guilty on the charge of murder in the first degree. Its verdict was silent on that charge.”) (emphasis added). In light of the jury’s silence in those cases, the Supreme Court assumed that the jury decided to acquit on the greater offense. See Id. at 190–91.
Courts in Indiana have therefore defined “implied acquittal” in line with the circumstances of Green and Price. It is “an ‘acquittal in which a jury convicts the defendant of a lesser-included offense without commenting on the greater-offense.’” Kocielko v. State, 938 N.E.2d 243, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Moore v. State, 882 N.E.2d 788, 798 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (May, J., concurring in result)), trans. denied; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 27 (9th ed. 2009).
Under that definition, Cleary’s first trial “did not result in ‘acquittal implied by conviction on on a lesser-included offense.’” Kocielko, 938 N.E.2d at 249 (quoting Price, 398 U.S. at 329). Rather, “‘[t]he jury’s express statement that it could not agree on a verdict as to the greater offense obviously precludes the inference that there was an implied acquittal.’” Haddix, 827 N.E.2d at 1165 (quoting U.S. v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187, 1192 (8th Cir. 1997)). Simply put, “we cannot infer from the jury’s verdicts that it believed [Cleary] was innocent.” Moore, 882 N.E.2d at 798. Cf. Kocielko, 938 N.E.2d at 249 (rejecting implied acquittal claim when defendant acquitted of one charge and jury deadlocked on two others because “[a] deadlocked jury does not result in acquittal barring retrial under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause.” (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) and Menifee v. State, 512 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ind. 1987)).
We do not interpret the statutory implied acquittal provision any differently than the doctrine developed from Green and Price. Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3(a)(1) codifies the implied acquittal doctrine, but nothing in the statute expands the doctrine to include circumstances where the jury affirmatively states that it has deadlocked on the greater offense. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, because the jury affirmatively deadlocked on the greater offenses at Cleary’s first trial rather than remaining silent as to those counts, Section 35-41-4-3(a)’s implied acquittal provision is not implicated. [Footnote omitted.] The guilty verdicts on the lesser-included offenses do not turn those deadlocked results into acquittals such that retrial would be barred under the statute.
Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, and Massa, J.J., concur.