Rucker, J.
As its first witness the State called G.L. [G.L. was the alleged sexual deviate conduct victim.] His testimony essentially tracked the events as set forth above. See Tr. at 18-39. The defense cross-examination of G.L. was largely uneventful, with G.L. essentially reasserting his direct examination testimony. See Tr. at 40-68. As its next witness the State called S.L., who is G.L.’s mother. In addition to background information, on direct examination S.L. basically testified concerning her own conduct on the evening in question, G.L.’s demeanor at the time, and her knowledge of and response to the alleged events. See Tr. at 70-82. On at least three occasions during cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to elicit from S.L. testimony about specific instances of G.L. not being truthful. One involved alleged behavioral problems G.L. was experiencing which resulted in his no longer living with his father, see Tr. at 83; another involved whether G.L. told his mother that he was attending school when allegedly he was not, see Tr. at 84; and in a third instance counsel sought additional “specific examples” of lies that G.L. may have told his mother. Tr. at 87. At each instance the trial court sustained the State’s relevancy objection. Jacobs complains the trial court erred because the testimony he sought was relevant under Indiana Evidence Rule 401 and admissible under Indiana Evidence Rules 404 and 405. According to Jacobs his “sole defense was that he did not do this, G.L., is not being truthful. G.L.’s character for truthfulness was the critical theme of Mr. Jacobs’s’ defense.” Br. of Appellant at 4. “Questions of [G.]L.’s mother exploring [G.]L.’s character for truthfulness/honesty were relevant and admissible and the trial court erred in precluding them.” Id.
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Three of our Rules of Evidence address character. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(a) provides that character evidence generally is inadmissible to prove conduct in conformity with that character. [Footnote omitted.] Evidence Rule 405(a) provides that whenever evidence of a person’s character traits is admissible, proof may be made by reputation evidence or opinion testimony. [Footnote omitted.] And important for our purposes, Evidence Rule 608 governs evidence of character and conduct of witnesses and provides:
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.
We first observe that on appeal Jacobs focuses his attention on Rules 404 and 405, but he makes no argument why Rule 608, which provides limitations to Rules 404 and 405, does not apply. In any event, Indiana Evidence Rule 608 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation for truthfulness but that specific instances may not be inquired into or proven by extrinsic evidence. Here, Jacobs’ evidence was not in the form of opinion or reputation, and therefore was not admissible under Rule 608(a). Instead, Jacobs attempted to delve into specific instances of G.L.’s conduct, namely, whether G.L. had lied to his mother on prior occasions; Rule 608(b) specifically prohibits inquiring into or proving specific instances by extrinsic evidence. See Beaty v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (“Indiana cases have consistently held that Evidence Rule 608(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence regarding specific instances of misconduct.”). In addition, the limited exception referenced in the last sentence of Rule 608(b) is not applicable because G.L.’s mother did not testify as to G.L.’s truthfulness.
Without saying so in express terms, Jacobs also implies the trial court infringed upon his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. See Br. of Appellant at 10 (declaring “[t]he constitutionally improper denial of Mr. Jacobs’s opportunity to elicit relevant character evidence is subject to a Chapman . . . harmless error analysis.”). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). It is true this Court has held that the evidence rule preventing evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness must yield to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and right to present a full defense. See State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ind. 1999). However, the Court limited this exception to very narrow circumstances—specifically prior false accusations of rape—that do not apply here. Id. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting evidence of specific instances of conduct regarding G.L.’s truthfulness. [Footnote omitted.]
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.