Dickson, J.
The authority of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission is limited to that delegated by statute. Here, in responding to allegations of discrimination arising from an inter-group squabble over the type of meal to be served to a group member’s allergic child, the Commission exceeded its authority because the alleged discriminatory practice did not relate to education, a statutory prerequisite for the Commission’s exercise of authority.
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….As these statements of purpose imply, the predominant purpose of FACES is to promote and foster its member families’ Catholic faith in various aspects of their childrens’ lives; education is but one aspect. The dinner-dance at which Mrs. Bridgewater contends that FACES failed to accommodate her daughter’s food allergy furthered the FACES members’ objective of providing Catholic spiritual and social enrichment. It was not an occasion for the teaching of academic subjects as part of the student’s curriculum. FACES planned the “All Souls’ Day Masquerade Ball” dinner-dance social event to coincide with the Catholic feast day of All Souls’ Day on November 2. The alleged disability discrimination thus occurred at a quasi-religious social function, not an educational one. To expansively interpret “relating to . . . education,” see Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(l), to apply to this dinner would convert almost every occasion of parental guidance and training into an activity “related to education.” This would eviscerate the function of “related to education” as a legislative prerequisite for the Commission’s enforcement powers.
Because the alleged discriminatory practice in this case does not relate to education, Mrs. Bridgewater’s claim of disability discrimination fell outside the statutory authority of the Commission….
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Conclusion
The Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims arising from an intra-group squabble over the type of meal to be served to a member family’s child at an “All Souls’ Day Masquerade Ball” dinner-dance social event—an incident not related to education and thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. We vacate the Commission’s final order and remand this cause with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss filed by FACES as to both claims.
Rush, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents in part with separate opinion.
Rucker, J., dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the Bridgewater disability discrimination claim fails because the alleged discriminatory practice—excluding one of the Bridgewater children from a meal at the Masquerade Ball due to her disability—did not “relat[e] . . . to education” within the meaning of Indiana’s Civil Rights Act. Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(l). However, I disagree that the Bridgewater retaliation claim is somehow derivative of and thus depends upon the disposition of the discrimination claim. Therefore on this issue I respectfully dissent.
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