Vaidik, C.J.
Finally, White claims that the “State violated [his] rights as a member of a ‘class of one,’ protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited under 42 U.S.C. 1983, by intentionally treating him differently than others similarly situated without a rational basis.” Appellant’s Br. p. 76. As support for his claim, White directs us to “a partial list of similarly situated persons” in his original and amended petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. at 77. Included on this list are judges, town-council members, and political officers from around the state. See P-C App. p. 71-81, 1032-46.
The State argues that White is actually alleging selective prosecution. We agree: White’s claims all circle back to his assertion that he and other political figures engaged in essentially the same conduct, yet only White was prosecuted. See Oral Arg. at 18:01, available at http://goo.gl/MaLuCp (Chief Judge Vaidik: “Is your class-of-one claim really in fact a selective-prosecution claim?” White’s attorney: “It’s different, but I understand to your point as selective prosecution, yes, it would be to that extent but it’s a class of one in that he was specifically targeted . . . .”). White cannot succeed on this claim. “Persons accused of wrongdoing can’t make class-of-one defenses to criminal charges.” Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) & United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied. “[A] defense of selective prosecution is limited to racial discrimination or other class-wide inequality . . . .” Id. The Seventh Circuit’s description of the two forms of selective prosecution is particularly useful here:
The first is simply failing to prosecute all known lawbreakers, whether because of ineptitude or (more commonly) because of lack of adequate resources. The resulting pattern of nonenforcement may be random, or an effort may be made to get the most bang for the prosecutorial buck by concentrating on the most newsworthy lawbreakers, but in either case the result is that people who are equally guilty of crimes or other violations receive unequal treatment, with some being punished and others getting off scot-free. That form of selective prosecution, although it involves dramatically unequal legal treatment, has no standing in equal protection law. The second form of selective prosecution, and the only one that is actionable under the federal Constitution, is where the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right, such as the right to free speech or to the free exercise of religion, or because of membership in a vulnerable group.
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) & United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1992)). White—a newsworthy lawbreaker who, as Secretary of State, was responsible for ensuring the integrity and security of our state’s elections—is alleging the first form of selective prosecution, and for that reason, his claim fails. [Footnote omitted.]
MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.