Massa, J.
Although course-of-investigation testimony may help prosecutors give the jury some context, it is often of little consequence to the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The core issue at trial is, of course, what the defendant did (or did not do), not why the investigator did (or did not do) something. Thus, course-of-investigation testimony is excluded from hearsay only for a limited purpose: to “bridge gaps in the trial testimony that would otherwise substantially confuse or mislead the jury.” Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011). The possibility the jury may wonder why police pursued a particular path does not, without more, make course-of-investigation testimony relevant. Kindred, 973 N.E.2d at 1252–53. Indeed, such testimony is of little value absent a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the investigation. . . . .
Our concern is the danger of prejudice where reliance on the course-of-investigation exclusion is misplaced. Indeed, “the use of out-of-court statements to show background has been identified as an area of widespread abuse.” United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kindred, 973 N.E.2d at 1253 (“While the need for this evidence is slight, the likelihood of misuse [is] great.” (internal quotations omitted)). There is a risk the jury will rely upon the out-of-court assertion as substantive evidence of guilt—rather than for the limited purpose of explaining police investigation—and the defendant will have no chance to challenge that evidence through cross-examination. [Footnote omitted.] Jones, 635 F.3d at 1040, 1046. The danger of undue prejudice is particularly high where the out-of-court assertion implicates the defendant in a crime similar to the one with which he or she is charged. See Hernandez, 785 N.E.2d at 300 (“[T]he prejudicial impact was great. Hernandez was on trial for promoting prostitution, and the statement in question asserted that her business was engaged in prostitution.”). And this danger is even higher where the out-of-court declarant directly accuses the defendant of committing the instant crime. In Ealy v. State, Phillip Ealy was charged with murder and carrying a handgun without a license. 685 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Ind. 1997). At trial, a detective testified he learned “Philco” was associated with the shooting and Phillip Ealy was known by that name. Id. at 1056. In balancing probative value and danger of prejudice, we held that testimony inadmissible because it was only relevant—and would therefore only be used—“to show that defendant was involved in the crime.” Id. at 1056 (finding the error did not require reversal because another witness provided the same evidence).
For this reason, we must pay careful attention to the purpose for which an out-of-court statement is offered. The ultimate inquiry is: Was the out-of-court statement used primarily to show the truth of its content, constituting inadmissible hearsay, or merely to explain subsequent police action, excluded from hearsay? To answer this question, we turn to the three-part test we articulated in Craig v. State:
1. Does the testimony or written evidence describe an out-of-court statement asserting a fact susceptible of being true or false?
If the statement contains no such assertion, it cannot be hearsay and the objection should be overruled. If the out-of-court statement does contain an assertion of fact, then the Court should consider the following before ruling:
2. What is the evidentiary purpose of the proffered statement?
. . . . If the evidentiary purpose is to prove a fact asserted, and such purpose is not approved under Evid. R. 801(d), then the hearsay objection should be sustained, unless the statement fits an exception to the hearsay rule.
If the proponent of the statement urges a purpose other than to prove a fact which is asserted, then the Court should consider the following before ruling:
3. Is the fact to be proved under the suggested purpose for the statement relevant to some issue in the case, and does any danger of prejudice outweigh its probative value?
. . . . If the fact sought to be proved under the suggested non-hearsay purpose is not relevant, or it is relevant but its danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value, the hearsay objection should be sustained.
630 N.E.2d at 211.
Here, Detective Smith testified that Blount’s girlfriend and her son provided Blount’s nickname when he asked them who shot the gun. The substance of the out-of-court statement—Blount was the shooter—is certainly susceptible of being true or false. Indeed, identity was the sole disputed issue at trial. Thus, we answer the first Craig question in the affirmative. As to the evidentiary purpose of the statements, the State argues it offered them not to prove the fact asserted but rather to explain why the police focused their investigation on Blount. That is a non-hearsay purpose; therefore, we proceed to the third Craig question, which asks us to weigh the probative value of the evidence under the proponent’s urged purpose against the risk of unfair prejudice. In this case, the out-of-court statements have little probative value when considered for the State’s proffered purpose of explaining why the officers pursued Blount. Blount made no allegation of police impropriety in narrowing their investigation to him; thus, the reason the police included Blount in the photo array was simply not at issue. [Footnote omitted.]
The State also argues Detective Smith’s testimony relaying the out-of-court statements is relevant for another non-hearsay purpose, to show identity:
Here, the course of police investigation evidence demonstrated to the jury how Defendant became a suspect and was identified as the shooter. That evidence is not marginally relevant, but was highly relevant to the central issue of the case—the identity of the person that Detective Smith witnessed firing a gun that day at the motel.
Trans. Pet. at 8. In other words, the State says Brock’s and her son’s statements that “Big D” committed the crime are relevant to show their truth—it really was “Big D” who committed the crime, and “Big D” is Shawn Blount. Thus, by asserting the statements were relevant because of their content establishing the suspect’s identity, the State effectively admitted Detective Smith’s testimony was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
On these facts, we believe the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value. Detective Smith could have effectively accomplished his goal of explaining how the search narrowed just as Detective Andrews did: “we obtained Mr. Blount’s nickname, Big D, through investigation.” Tr. at 162. Instead, Detective Smith testified to prejudicial statements by out-of-court witnesses: Brock and her son directly accused Blount of being responsible for the crime charged, yet Blount was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine them. . . . .
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.