Bradford, J.
Our review of the record lead us to conclude that the evidence does not establish a violation of Indiana Code section 9-19-6-4. While Officer Packard did testify that the white light emanating from the tail lamp was “significant” and overwhelmed the red, Tr. p. 6, he never testified that the red light was not plainly visible. The plain language of section 9-19-6-4 does not only not prohibit colors of light other than red, is does not even prohibit those other colors from being the predominant color. So long as some red light is plainly visible at a distance of 500 feet from at least two tail lamps, there is no violation of section 9-16-6-4. In any event, the record does not establish that Officer Packard ever observed Williams’s vehicle from the required 500 foot distance, as his testimony was only that observed the vehicle from a distance of anywhere from 300 to 700 feet. As Officer Packard admitted, “I don’t know the exact distance.” Tr. p. 11.
The State argues that even if the condition of Williams’s tail lamps did not amount to an infraction, Officer Packard still, in good faith, had reasonable suspicion to believe that it did. “Although a law enforcement officer’s good faith belief that a person has committed a violation will justify a traffic stop…, an officer’s mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith.” Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Officer Packard testified that he believed it to be an infraction that the white light emanating from the tail lamp overwhelmed the red. As discussed above, pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-16-6-4 as written, this, quite simply, is not an infraction. Consequently, Officer Packard held a mistaken belief, rather than good-faith reasonable suspicion, that an infraction had occurred.
The State relies on the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 2013). At issue in that case was the Indiana Window Tint Statute . . . . A police officer pulled over the defendant based on his perception that the tint of the vehicle in question was sufficiently dark that he could not clearly recognize or identify the occupant, although it was later determined that the windows had a light transmittance of 38%, within the legal range. Id. While the Sanders court recognized that the defendant was relieved of any liability under the Window Tint Statute by the light transmittance of the window, “it [did] not serve to vitiate the legality of the traffic stop.” Id. The fact that the officer could not recognize the occupants of the vehicle, coupled with the fact that the actual tint closely bordered the statutory limit, led the Court to conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion that an infraction had occurred. Id.
Sanders, however, is distinguishable. In Sanders, the officer’s observations established a prima facie case that the infraction occurred, i.e., he could not clearly recognize or identify the occupants of the vehicle. The fact that the defendant was later able to establish an affirmative defense had no retroactive effect on the existence of reasonable suspicion. In contrast and as discussed, Officer Packard’s observations did not make out a prima facie case that an infraction occurred, regardless of his mistaken belief that they did. Moreover, the actual amount of red light in this case did not closely border any applicable legal limit. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-19-6-4, at least when it comes to the presence of red light, there is no limit to closely border—either the red light is plainly visible or it is not, and Officer Packard never testified that it was not. [Footnote omitted.] The State’s reliance on Sanders is unavailing. Because we conclude that all of the evidence supporting Williams’s conviction was gathered as a result of an illegal stop, we reverse Williams’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor marijuana possession with no possibility for retrial.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.