Barnes, J.
We further observe that, although there was evidence that Adcock touched L.P.’s vagina with his penis, it is not possible on appeal to merely reduce a conviction for molestation or sexual misconduct with a minor by penetration to the less-serious offense of molestation or misconduct by touching or fondling when the evidence of penetration is lacking. See Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 798-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. “While child molesting by fondling or touching is a lesser offense than child molesting by deviate sexual conduct [or penetration] in terms of sentencing, it is neither inherently nor factually included in the greater offense and is in fact an entirely separate offense.” Id. at 799. Thus, a sufficiency challenge to Adcock’s convictions on Counts 3 and 6 would have resulted in complete vacation of those convictions, not their reduction to lesser felonies. See also Spurlock, 675 N.E.2d at 317 (ordering vacation of child molesting conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence of penetration, not reduction of that conviction to a lesser conviction for molestation by touching or fondling).
To summarize, we conclude appellate counsel, for no apparent strategic or tactical reason, overlooked significant and obvious problems with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of Adcock’s convictions. If such arguments had been made, there is more than a reasonable probability that they would have been successful; we would have been required to vacate each of the convictions. And, because those vacations would be based upon insufficient evidence, the State would be precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from retrying Adcock. See Jaramillo v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied. We also conclude that these sufficiency problems are stronger than the issues appellate counsel actually raised on direct appeal. As such, Adcock received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as a matter of law, and his convictions must now be vacated.