Baker, J.
In this case, a pharmacist breached one of her most sacred duties by viewing the prescription records of a customer and divulging the information she learned from those records to the client’s ex-boyfriend. A jury heard extensive evidence during a four-day trial and ultimately found that the pharmacist and her employer are liable for the damages sustained by the customer as a result of the breach. We are loath to disturb jury verdicts and decline to do so in this case.
Walgreen Company raises a number of issues in this appeal. First, it argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant summary judgment or a directed verdict in Walgreen’s favor on Abigail Hinchy’s claims based on respondeat superior and negligent retention and supervision of an employee. Second, Walgreen argues that Hinchy’s attorney engaged in improper ex parte communication when he filed a trial brief under seal with the trial court and did not provide a copy to Walgreen. Third, Walgreen contends that the jury was improperly instructed on issues surrounding respondeat superior and the tort of public disclosure of private facts. Fourth, Walgreen argues that the $1.8 million jury verdict was excessive and based on improper factors. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
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…Here, on the other hand, much of Withers’s conduct was of the same general nature as her ordinary job duties, and much of her conduct was of the same general nature authorized by her employer. The Doe Court acknowledged that “[i]f some of the employee’s actions were authorized, the question of whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of employment is one for the jury.” Id. at 457. Here, as stated above, some of Withers’s actions were authorized. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Walgreen’s motions for summary judgment and directed verdict and permitting the jury to rule on the issue.
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A. Jury Instructions 8 and 10: Respondeat Superior
1. Instruction 8
Final Instruction 8 reads as follows:
An employer is liable for the wrongful acts of its employee which are committed within the scope of employment.
An act is within the scope of employment if it is incidental to the employee’s job duties, that is to say, the employee’s wrongful act originated in activities closely associated with her job.
In deciding whether an employee’s wrongful act was incidental to her job duties or originated in activities closely associated with her job, you may consider:
1. whether the wrongful act was of the same general nature as her authorized job duties;
2. whether the wrongful act is intermingled with authorized job duties; and
3. whether the employment provided the opportunity or the means by which to commit the wrongful act.
Appellant’s App. p. 825.
Walgreen argues that this instruction is an incorrect recitation of Indiana law with respect to its explanation of the term “incidental.” It directs our attention to the Bushong definition of incidental: “An act is incidental to authorized conduct when it is subordinate to or pertinent to an act which the servant is employed to perform or when it is done to an appreciable extent, to further his employer’s business.” 790 N.E.2d at 473. According to Walgreen, the fact that instruction 8 makes no mention of these standards makes it erroneous as a matter of law.
Initially, we note that Walgreen’s argument amounts to a position that instruction 8 is an incomplete, rather than incorrect, statement of the law. As such, Walgreen was required to tender a more complete instruction. FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Walgreen makes no argument on appeal as to why its tendered instructions on respondeat superior would have been preferable.
Moreover, to the extent that Walgreen argues that the mere facts that Withers was on duty and using Walgreen equipment is insufficient to establish respondeat superior, Hinchy agrees. But we agree with Hinchy that these facts are relevant and that a reasonable jury may consider them in reaching its conclusion on the ultimate issue. Thus, the instruction is a correct statement of Indiana law.
Furthermore, the definition of “incidental” included within instruction 8 is derived from multiple sources. Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453; Wilson v. Isaacs, 917 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), vacated in part by 929 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. 2010); Ellis v. City of Martinsville, 940 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Correction, 871 N.E.2d 975, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Additionally, to the extent that Walgreen finds fault with the clause regarding intermingling with job duties, we note that this clause likewise finds support in Indiana caselaw. Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989); Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453-54; Interim Healthcare of Fort Wayne, Inc. v. Moyer, 746 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. 1993); Wilson, 917 N.E.2d at 1258. We find instruction 8 to be a correct statement of the law and decline to reverse on this basis.
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2. Instruction 10
Final Instruction 10 reads as follows: “You are instructed that [Withers] admits she was acting in the course and scope of her employment with Walgreen Co. when she reviewed [Hinchy’s] prescription information.” Appellant’s App. p. 827.
Walgreen argues that this instruction is misleading because it could have led the jury to find that Withers’s admission was binding on Walgreen. See 22 Ind. Prac., Civil Trial Practice § 26.2 (observing that an “admission is not binding on any party other than the admitting party”). Over Walgreen’s objection, the trial court removed a second sentence to the instruction: “You are to accept this fact as conclusive and binding as to [Withers].” Tr. p. 1027-28. The trial court removed the sentence because it made it sound as if it only applied to the case against Withers. Id. at 1028. Walgreen argues that the instruction should not have been given at all, but if it were given, should have at least included the second sentence.
Walgreen overlooks the distinction between Withers’s admission being “binding” and being “relevant.” While her admission was not binding as to Walgreen, it was relevant to whether she was acting in the course of her employment, which is relevant to the ultimate determination of vicarious liability. Additionally, we note that Walgreen extensively cross-examined Withers and made sure the jury understood that the admission had been made by Withers’s attorney and that she did not necessarily understand what it meant. Tr. p. 690-91. Therefore, any error was cured by Walgreen’s own questioning.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have found as follows: (1) the trial court did not err denying Walgreen’s summary judgment and directed verdict motions on respondeat superior liability; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error with respect to an ex parte brief filed by Hinchy; (3) the jury instructions were not erroneous; and (4) the damages award was not excessive or based on improper factors.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and ROBB, J., concur.