Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issues
Michael Dwain Neal (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of Amanda Austin’s (“Mother”) petition for post-secondary education expenses on behalf of their adult child, A.N. Father raises two issues for our review: (1) as a matter of first impression, whether the trial court had authority under Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 to issue an order for payment of educational support for a child who had reached the age of nineteen, where the parties’ original child support order was issued in August of 2000 but the most recent order concerning child support was issued after June 30, 2012; and (2) whether the amount of post-secondary education support ordered by the trial court was an abuse of discretion. Concluding the trial court did not have authority to issue an order for educational support, we reverse. [Footnote omitted.]
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Prior to July 1, 2012, Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 provided that a person’s child support obligation, including the obligation to pay educational expenses, ceased when the child became twenty-one years of age, unless certain special conditions were met. See Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6 (2011). Effective July 1, 2012, our legislature amended the statute: that amendment lowered the presumptive age for the termination of child support from twenty-one to nineteen, but the amendment added that the terminated support obligation “does not include support for educational needs.” Compare Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6 (2012) (“The duty to support a child under this chapter, which does not include support for educational needs, ceases when the child becomes nineteen (19) years of age . . . .”) with Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6 (2011) (“The duty to support a child under this chapter ceases when the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age . . . .”). And in May 2013, our legislature passed a second, retroactive amendment to the statute via Public Law 207–2013, section 45, adding subsections (c), (d), and (e), which added filing deadlines based on a child-petitioner’s age. The statute, in its current form, reads in relevant part:
(a) The duty to support a child under this chapter, which does not include support for educational needs, ceases when the child becomes nineteen (19) years of age unless any of the following conditions occurs:
(1) The child is emancipated before becoming nineteen (19) years of age. In this case the child support, except for the educational needs outlined in section 2(a)(1) of this chapter, terminates at the time of emancipation, although an order for educational needs may continue in effect until further order of the court.
(2) The child is incapacitated. In this case the child support continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.
(3) The child:
(A) is at least eighteen (18) years of age;
(B) has not attended a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution for the prior four (4) months and is not enrolled in a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution; and
(C) is or is capable of supporting himself or herself through employment.
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(c) If a court has established a duty to support a child in a court order issued before July 1, 2012, the:
(1) parent or guardian of the child; or
(2) child;
may file a petition for educational needs until the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age.
(d) If a court has established a duty to support a child in a court order issued after June 30, 2012, the:
(1) parent or guardian of the child; or
(2) child;
may file a petition for educational needs until the child becomes nineteen (19) years of age.
(e) If:
(1) an order was issued after June 30, 2012, that denied support for educational needs to a child who was less than twenty-one (21) years of age at the time the petition for educational needs was filed; and
(2) support for educational needs was denied based on the fact that the child was older than eighteen (18) years of age;
notwithstanding any other law, a parent or guardian of the child or the child may file with the court a subsequent petition for educational needs. The court shall consider the petition on the merits in accordance with this section and may not consider the absence of subsection (c) from law at the time of the initial filing.
Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6. According to Father’s reading of the statute, subsection (d) precludes Mother or A.N. from seeking support for educational needs because A.N. already reached the age of nineteen and the Agreed Order was approved by the trial court after June 30, 2012. It would follow, then, that the trial court lacked statutory authority to issue an order for educational expenses with respect to A.N.
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In sum, we hold that Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6—and specifically subsections (c) and (d)—necessitates that where the most recent order establishing a child support obligation was issued after June 30, 2012, the child must file a petition for educational needs before the child becomes nineteen years of age. Mother and A.N. are not the sort of unsuspecting parties that we believe the General Assembly’s 2013 amendments were focused on. Here, subsequent to the 2012 amendment, Mother participated in the court system and obtained a support order (i.e. the Agreed Order) that specifically referenced the updated statute’s effect of establishing nineteen as the age of legal emancipation. Thus, Mother was aware of the statute’s requirement that a petition for educational support must be filed before A.N. turned nineteen. The trial court issued a support order concerning A.N. after June 30, 2012, and A.N. did not file his petition for post-secondary educational expenses until after turning nineteen years old. Therefore, A.N.’s petition was not filed within the limitations of Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 and the trial court lacked the authority to issue an order for educational expenses.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court did not have authority under Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 to issue an order for educational support for a child who was at least nineteen years of age where the parties’ most recent order concerning child support was issued after June 30, 2012. Therefore, we reverse.
Reversed.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.