Friedlander, J.
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Appellant contends that Adoptive Parents were barred from adopting due to their prior felony convictions. She specifically argues that although the disqualifying convictions were waived for blood-relative placement during the CHINS proceedings, the court was barred from granting the adoption petition pursuant to Ind. Code Ann § 31-19-11-1(c) (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session & Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly).
I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c) provides in relevant part:
[T]he court may not grant an adoption if a petitioner for adoption has been convicted of any of the felonies described as follows:
(1) Murder (IC 35-42-1-1).
(2) Causing suicide (IC 35-42-1-2).
(3) Assisting suicide (IC 35-42-1-2.5).
(4) Voluntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-3).
(5) Reckless homicide (IC 35-42-1-5).
(6) Battery as a felony (IC 35-42-2-1).
(7) Domestic battery (IC 35-42-2-1.3).
(8) Aggravated battery (IC 35-42-2-1.5).
(9) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).
(10) Criminal confinement (IC 35-42-3-3).
(11) A felony sex offense under IC 35-42-4.
(12) Carjacking (IC 35-42-5-2) (repealed).
(13) Arson (IC 35-43-1-1).
(14) Incest (IC 35-46-1-3).
(15) Neglect of a dependent (IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1) and IC 35-46-1-4(a)(2)).
(16) Child selling (IC 35-46-1-4(d)).
(17) A felony involving a weapon under IC 35-47 or IC 35-47.5.
(18) A felony relating to controlled substances under IC 35-48-4.
(19) An offense relating to material or a performance that is harmful to minors or obscene under IC 35-49-3.
(20) A felony under IC 9-30-5.
(21) A felony under the laws of another jurisdiction, including a military court, that is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses listed in subdivisions (1) through (20).
However, the court is not prohibited from granting an adoption based upon a felony conviction under subdivision (6), (10), (12), (13), (17), (18), or (20) or its equivalent under subdivision (21), if the date of the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.
Maternal grandmother has a conviction from 1997 for class D felony neglect of a dependent, which falls under subdivision (15) above and is not subject to the discretionary provision applicable to certain other enumerated prior felonies that are more than five years old. Accordingly, the statute makes clear that the court was prohibited from granting the adoption in her favor. [Footnote omitted.]
DCS, as co-appellee, urges that “the purposes and policy of Indiana’s adoption law would not be promoted by a strict application [of the statute] under the circumstances of this case.” Co-Appellee’s Brief at 20. Specifically, DCS argues that application of the statute’s irrebuttable presumption of unfitness would result in a violation of the children’s due process rights. Appellant does not respond to this argument.
It is well established that “the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in any adoption case.” In re Adoption of S.A., 918 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. See also In re Adoption of K.S., 980 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“[t]he purpose of Indiana’s adoption statutes is to protect and promote the welfare of children by providing them with stable family units”). The evidence overwhelmingly establishes in this case that it is in I.B. and W.B.’s best interests to be adopted by Adoptive Parents and remain in this loving, intact family unit along with their older half-brothers. Appellant would have us close our eyes to this evidence and apply the irrebuttable presumption set out in the statute – that is, individuals convicted of certain enumerated felonies are per se unfit to adopt. Although in many cases this presumption may be apt, it is not in all, and the United States Supreme Court has warned that “[s]tatutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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In sum, we conclude that I.B. and W.B. were entitled to an individualized determination of their best interests before being removed from the intact, biological family unit in which they had lived since the beginning of 2013. This is precisely the procedure that was provided below, and the evidence established that despite maternal grandmother’s prior conviction, it was in I.B. and W.B.’s best interests to be adopted into this loving, secure home in which they have thrived and which is made up of family members with whom they are closely bonded. Under these circumstances, the statute is unconstitutional as applied and maternal grandmother’s conviction cannot be dispositive.
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Judgment affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.