Massa, J.
The parents of a child who choked to death during lunchtime in a high school cafeteria sued the school and several administrators. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
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Finally, we note there has been some confusion as to how the trial court should proceed upon remand. In its original opinion, the panel below suggested the application of the discovery rule was a question of fact for the jury, Lyons, 990 N.E.2d at 481, but upon rehearing, the panel stated it was rather a question of law for the trial court. Lyons, 996 N.E.2d at 1280. We agree on both counts.
The question of whether a plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the ITCA is one of law, Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. 2013), but the answer may depend upon the resolution of disputed facts. Gregor v. Szarmach, 706 N.E.2d 240, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). And the application of the discovery rule necessarily involves questions of fact. Wehling v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992) (stating that whether the plaintiffs knew or “in the exercise of ordinary diligence” could have known of the defendant’s alleged negligence was “a question of fact for the factfinder to answer”). When the discovery rule applies, the time for filing does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should know of the tort. Id. Similarly, the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine is a question of equity, but it may depend upon questions of fact, which are properly answered by the fact-finder. Fager, 610 N.E.2d at 253 n.5 (“While the fraudulent concealment exception is an equitable doctrine, the relevant facts may be determined by a jury in the event of trial.”). When the doctrine applies, a plaintiff has a reasonable time after discovery of the tort to bring his action. Id. at 251.
Such mixed questions of law and fact are best handled through carefully drafted jury instructions. Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind. 1990) (noting mixed questions of law and fact present “a difficult problem in the drafting of instructions” (quoting Clyde E. Williams & Assoc., Inc. v. Boatman, 176 Ind. App. 430, 435, 375 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1978))). The trial court may wish to consider something like this:
Indiana law provides that a plaintiff must file a claim of negligence against a municipal defendant within 180 days after the defendant commits negligence. There are a few exceptions to this general rule, and the Lyonses claim two of those exceptions in this case.
To decide whether the Lyonses filed their claim within the required period of time, first, you must decide whether, and if so when, the defendants committed the act of negligence.
Next, you must decide when a reasonable person would have discovered the act of negligence.
If you decide that the Lyonses knew or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the negligence prior to July 15, 2009, you must decide in favor of the defendants. But if not, the Lyonses filed this lawsuit within the required time period.
Or, if the Lyonses prove by the greater weight of the evidence that (1) the defendants actively concealed an important fact with the intent to mislead or hinder the Lyonses from obtaining information about the negligence, and (2) the Lyonses filed this lawsuit within a reasonable time period after they discovered, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the negligence, then they filed this lawsuit within the required time period.
But if the defendants prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the Lyonses did not file their lawsuit within the required time period, you must decide in favor of the defendants. [FN: We crafted this instruction based upon the Indiana Model Civil Jury Instructions. See Ind. Model Civil Jury Instructions, Instruction Nos. 1559 & 1561 (Ind. Judges Ass’n 2013). Although these particular model instructions are intended for use in medical malpractice cases, we believe they may—with appropriate modification—be suitable in this context.]
Of course, we entrust the proper instruction of the jury to the trial court’s sound discretion, WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 2002), and our suggestion here is intended not as an expression of doubt or an imposition of a mandate but rather as an offer of guidance. We are confident the trial court will accept it in that spirit.
Conclusion
We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.