Rucker, J.
Concerning Campbell’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to the pattern jury instruction because it contained an incorrect statement of the law, Campbell specifically refers to the second sentence of the instruction, namely: “If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct, but also to cause the result.” Ind. Pattern Jury Instructions – Crim. No. 9.05. In support Campbell cites Corley v. State, 663 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. not sought. In that case a jury convicted Anthon Corley of murder. On appeal he argued, among other things, the trial court erred in refusing his tendered instruction on culpability. His instruction read in pertinent part: “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. [If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result.]” Id. at 177 (brackets in original). The trial court refused to give Corley’s proposed instruction and gave its own instruction instead which read in pertinent part, “[a] person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. Rejecting Corley’s claim of error, the Court of Appeals declared:
The only difference in the two instructions is the language in Corley’s tendered instruction regarding “causing a result.” He argues that it was error not to include this language in the instruction because the jury was not advised that he must have a conscious objective to cause [the victim’s] death. However, Corley cites to no authority for this proposition and we do not find any. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (1993) which defines intentionally, knowingly and recklessly does not include the additional language found in Corley’s instruction. Thus the tendered instruction is not a correct statement of the law. It was not error for the court to refuse the tendered instruction.
Id. at 177 (first emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted).
However, despite the Court of Appeals’ declaration we make two observations. First, the precise language the court found unsupported by authority was contained in the pattern jury instructions at the time. See Ind. Pattern Jury Instructions – Crim. 9.05 (1991) (declaring in pertinent part: “If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result.”). Second, another panel of the court had reached a different conclusion four years earlier in Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. In that case Betty Jo Johnson was charged as an accessory to burglary as a Class A felony. The charging information alleged the intent to commit several alternative underlying felony offenses including murder, battery with a deadly weapon, battery causing serious bodily injury, intimidation by threat of forcible felony, or intimidation with a deadly weapon. After a jury trial Johnson was convicted as charged. On appeal she argued among other things that her conviction could not stand because “the case was submitted to the jury on an illegal theory.” Id. at 763. More precisely Johnson contended that because of “the manner in which the offense of burglary was charged, the State was relieved of its burden of proving that her accomplices intended felonies.” Id. at 766. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention and went on to add:
Though no issue has been raised upon this point, we have examined the trial court’s final jury instructions to assure ourselves that the State was not in fact relieved of its burden of proof. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that “[i]f a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result.” This instruction, in combination with the other instructions defining the offenses of burglary, battery, intimidation, and accessory responsibility, in the language of the pertinent statutes, properly informed the jury of the State’s burden of proof.
Id. at 768. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals here acknowledged “some tension between Johnson and Corley as to whether the second sentence of the pattern instruction is a correct statement of the law,” and noted that this Court “has not weighed in on the subject . . . .” Campbell, 3 N.E.3d at 1041. We also acknowledge the tension and now weigh in.
It is of course the case that an instruction which tracks verbatim the language of a statute is presumptively correct. See, e.g., Ben-Yisrayl, 729 N.E.2d at 111 (rejecting defendant’s claim of error regarding jury instructions on “intentionally” or “knowingly” in part because the challenged instruction “defined the terms ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ precisely as they are defined by statute” (citation omitted)). And here the language of the statute provides in relevant part “[a] person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). This precise language comprised the first sentence of the contested instruction at stake here. But it is not also the case that an instruction is an incorrect statement of the law merely because it includes language not contained in the statute. See, e.g., Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. 2013) (approving a pattern jury instruction on the consequences of not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill verdicts that synthesized the wording of several statutory provisions); Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to find error in the trial court giving a pattern jury instruction that elaborated on the wording in a provision of the Indiana Jury Rules). Rather, “[t]he purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. 1991)). Here, the second sentence of the contested instruction serves to emphasize the heavy burden placed on the State to prove that a defendant acted intentionally. And this is so because not only must the State prove that an accused had the “conscious objective” to engage in the prohibited conduct but also that he intended to “cause the result” of his conduct. For clarity the sentence might be amended to read “If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, the State is required to prove it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also cause the result.” Nonetheless even in its current form the instruction holds the State to this higher burden of proof even though the statute defining intentionally does not do so in express terms. The State does not contend this is an inappropriate burden and we conclude that Pattern Jury Instruction 9.05 represents a correct statement of the law. [Footnote omitted.] As such trial counsel in this case did not render ineffective assistance in failing to object to the instruction.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.