Barnes, J.
The post-conviction court placed much emphasis on whether the burglaries could be described without referring to each other. However, as Reed clarified, that analysis is not dispositive regarding whether the offenses are a single episode of criminal conduct. Our supreme court has also noted that “[t]here is no requirement that the victims be the same, and the acts of two crimes are almost always distinct at least in one element.” Harris, 861 N.E.2d at 1188. Thus, the fact that two different businesses were burglarized is also not dispositive. Instead, we focus on the small distance between the two burglaries, the short amount of time between them, and the apparent scheme that tied them together. Based on that analysis, we conclude that the two burglaries were “closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). As a result, the consecutive sentencing limitation of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 is applicable, and the maximum consecutive sentence possible for the two burglaries was ten years rather than the sixteen years imposed by the trial court. Gallien was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue.
BROWN, J., concurs.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with opinion:
In the instant matter, Gallien and his companions broke into a Goodwill store in Floyds Knobs and stole money and a moving dolly. Gallien and his companions then drove over four miles to a tavern in Galena. After arriving at the tavern, Gallien and his companions broke into the tavern and stole an automated teller machine, a change machine, and additional money. These facts, similar to the facts presented in Reynolds, depict two completely separate thefts. Notably, this is not a situation where Gallien and his companions broke into neighboring houses or businesses. Instead, this is a situation where Gallien and his companions committed one robbery, drove to another location over four miles away from the first location, and committed a second robbery. Based on these facts, I do not believe that there was a reasonable probability that a reviewing panel of this court would have accepted the argument that Gallien’s actions constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. As such, I would conclude that Gallien failed to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. I would therefore conclude that the trial court’s determination that Gallien failed to prove that he suffered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was not clearly erroneous and would vote to affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.