Per Curiam
The trial court dismissed Mr. Zavodnik’s action under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E), and the Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for failure to file a timely brief and appendix. We now deny transfer by this per curiam opinion, which also gives guidance to this state’s courts on some options when confronted with abusive and vexatious litigation practices.
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Discussion
On transfer, Mr. Zavodnik argues that the trial court and Court of Appeals (1) erroneously denied him IFP status, (2) erroneously refused to “correct, fix and complete the record,” and (3) repeatedly discriminated against him. His first claim is moot, because the Court of Appeals did not dismiss for failure to pay the filing fee, but for failure to timely file his brief and appendix in accordance with well-settled law. His second claim is waived because he fails to show any effort to present his request to the trial court in the first instance as the Appellate Rules require. And his final claim is waived because he fails to support it with cogent argument or citation to relevant authority. We therefore deny transfer and turn our attention to procedures for trial courts to curtail abusive litigation practices.
I. Litigants Do Not Have a License to Abuse the Litigation Process
Every resource that courts devote to an abusive litigant is a resource denied to other legitimate cases with good-faith litigants. See Sumbry v. Boklund, 836 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ind. 2005). There is no right to engage in abusive litigation, and the state has a legitimate interest in the preservation of valuable judicial and administrative resources. See Parks v. Madison Cnty., 783 N.E.2d 711, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
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II. Pro Se Litigants Must Play by the Rules
Mr. Zavodnik has argued that the system is unfairly biased against him as a pro se litigant. Mr. Zavodnik has every right to represent himself in legal proceedings, but a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. See Matter of G.P.U., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014). “[O]ne acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying IFP application and dismissing appeal). Even if a court may take reasonable steps to prevent a good faith pro se litigant from being placed at an unfair disadvantage, an abusive litigant can expect no latitude.
Contrary to Mr. Zavodnik’s arguments, the system actually imposes more restrictions on represented parties, at least indirectly through regulation of their attorneys. For instance, an attorney may be sanctioned for a willful violation of the rule that an attorney’s signature on a pleading constitutes a certificate that the attorney has read the pleading; that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. See T.R. 11(A). In addition, attorneys may be disciplined for abusive litigation practices. See, e.g., Prof. Cond. Rules 3.1 (asserting a position for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law or fact); 3.3(a)(1) (knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 3.4(d) (making a frivolous discovery request); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Because these rules have no application to pro se litigants, it is all the more important that courts be able to fashion appropriate sanctions for abusive pro se litigants.
III. Litigants Do Not Have an Unfettered Right to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
It has long been the policy of this state that arbitrary economic discrimination in the halls of justice is wrong, and from the date of its admission to the Union, Indiana has been a leader in providing indigent persons with fair treatment while in court. See Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150, 157, 159 (Ind. 1992). To this end, a person without sufficient means to prosecute an action may apply for leave to prosecute as an indigent person, i.e., IFP, and thus be relieved of certain requirements, including the requirement to prepay a filing fee. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-10-1-1 (2008) (“IFP Statute”); Ind. Code § 34-10-1-2(b) (2008); Ind. Appellate Rule 40.
However, the right to invoke this privilege is not without conditions or limits. The IFP Statute places the burden upon the party seeking to proceed IFP to demonstrate that he or she is both indigent and without sufficient means to prosecute the action or bring an appeal. See Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ind. 2001); Campbell, 605 N.E.2d at 159. A request to proceed IFP necessarily requires the consideration of relevant facts, which may require an evidentiary hearing. See Offutt v. Sheehan, 168 Ind. App. 491, 344 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1976). A court need not take an applicant’s representations and documents at face value, but in appropriate circumstances should inquire into the practicalities of the applicant’s financial resources. [Footnote omitted.] We note that Mr. Zavodnik has somehow summoned the financial wherewithal to produce probably tens of thousands of pages of filings in well over 100 cases he has brought. Courts may rightfully explore how such an applicant can afford such expenses but claim to lack sufficient means to pay a filing fee. “Indigency determinations present a subject for the sound discretion of the trial court, and a very clear case of abuse must be shown before this discretionary power can be interfered with.” Campbell, 605 N.E.2d at 159. In addition, the legislature has provided: “The court shall deny an application made under [the IFP Statute] if the court determines . . . [t]he applicant is unlikely to prevail on the applicant’s claim or defense.” Ind. Code § 34-10-1-2(d). Without defining the exact parameters of this directive, we conclude that IFP status may be properly denied if the court determines that the applicant is asserting a claim that is frivolous or upon which relief cannot be granted, is seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune, or is attempting to relitigate a claim that is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. Cf. Ind. Code § 34-58-1-2 (the Screening Statute). A court may also revoke a litigant’s IFP status as a sanction for abusive litigation practices during a proceeding, including baseless attempts to obtain a change of judge under T.R. 53.1 or otherwise. We note that even the United States Supreme Court has limited an abusive petitioner’s ability to proceed IFP based on his history of filing frivolous petitions. See Matter of McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989). Those who abuse the state’s legal system cannot expect to do it with the aid of a state subsidy.
IV. Courts May Place Reasonable Limits on Filings by Abusive Litigants
This Court’s rules of procedure impose page or word limitations, formatting requirements, and organizational mandates on some documents. E.g., Ind. Appellate Rules 43, 44, and 46. Mostly, however, the rules allow broad latitude in how litigants present their requests and arguments to a court. Most litigants do not abuse the rules’ general lack of explicit restrictions. But Mr. Zavodnik has, by habitually presenting filings and supporting documents that are massive, disorganized, repetitive, at times barely legible, and often of dubious relevance. He files motions that are overlapping, supplements to motions, and repeated motions for reconsideration. In addition, his filings often do not conform with the explicit requirements of the rules, leading to return by the clerk for correction and deemed filed on the date tendered when eventually corrected. These practices create confusion and put an enormous burden on the court, its staff, the clerk, and opposing parties. When a litigant makes a practice of such abusive filings, a court may place reasonable restrictions on the litigant’s filings tailored to the particular abuses of that litigant.
After due consideration of a litigant’s history of abuse, a court may be justified in imposing restrictions such as the following [Footnote omitted]:
- Require the litigant to accompany future pleadings with an affidavit certifying under penalty of perjury that the allegations are true to the best of the litigant’s knowledge, information, and belief.
- Direct the litigant to attach to future complaints a list of all cases previously filed involving the same, similar, or related cause of action.
- Direct that future pleadings will be stricken if they do not meet the requirements that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” T.R. 8(A)(1) and (E)(1).
- Require the litigant to state clearly and concisely at the beginning of a motion the relief requested.
- Require the litigant to provide specific page citations to documents alleged by the litigant to support an argument or position.
- Limit the litigant’s ability to request reconsideration and to file repetitive motions.
- Limit the number of pages or words of pleadings, motions, and other filings.
- Limit the length of the title that may be used for a filing.
- Limit the amount or length of exhibits or attachments that may accompany a filing.
- Instruct the clerk to reject without return for correction future filings that do not strictly comply with applicable rules of procedure and conditions ordered by the court.
V. Judges Should Not Bow to Baseless Demands for Disqualification
Mr. Zavodnik’s abusive litigation practices in this case and others have included unrelenting attempts to replace the judges presiding over his cases for alleged delays in rulings pursuant to T.R. 53.1 and for alleged bias, prejudice, or misconduct by the judge. But judges presiding over a case are not required to disqualify themselves as a result of a litigant’s unfounded accusations, abusive tactics, or attempts to manipulate the system. To the contrary, judges have an affirmative duty to preside over cases unless disqualification is mandatory. Rule 2.7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law.” The comment to this rule provides:
Judges must be available to decide the matters that come before the court. Although there are times when disqualification is necessary to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must be available to decide matters that come before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The dignity of the court, the judge’s respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the judge’s colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues.
Correspondingly, Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification only when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including [when the] judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The law starts with the presumption that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. A judge’s exposure to evidence through judicial sources is generally insufficient to establish bias. The fact that a litigant has appeared before a judge in prior cases does not establish bias or prejudice. Prejudice is not inferred from adverse judicial rulings. Mandatory disqualification requires a showing of a personal, individual bias against the litigant. See Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003). A raw accusation of bias creates no reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality. See Tri Lakes Regional Sewer Dist. v. Geiger, 830 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Ind. 2005). A party cannot be permitted to disqualify a judge simply by alleging bias. See id.
In Matter of Appointment of a Special Judge In Wabash Circuit Court, while a proceeding was pending in the Wabash Circuit Court, the defendants (a husband and wife) filed a third party complaint naming the presiding judge as a third party defendant. 500 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. 1986). The judge then filed a certification for the appointment of a special judge under T.R. 79, which requires recusal when a judge is a party to the proceeding. But this Court declined to appoint a special judge:
The circumstances so revealed show prima facie that the defendants in a civil action are engaged in a pattern of conduct the purpose of which is to totally stultify the judicial power of the Wabash Circuit Court as it may be directed toward them. . . . Their goal of insulating themselves from judicial authority is being accomplished through the artifice of filing a claim against the sitting judge, thereby imposing upon the judge the automatic duty of self-disqualification required by said rule. If this can be successfully achieved by the filing of specious claims, it can be repeated when any successor judge assumes jurisdiction in their case. The end result of the success of such a plan is constitutionally intolerable.
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Within these unusual circumstances, it would be pointless to appoint a successor judge to assume the jurisdiction of the Wabash Circuit Court in the case pending below. There is a strong likelihood that any such successor judge would meet the same fate as did Judge Ford and he or she would be made the subject of yet another claim before a ruling could be made. We therefore direct that the Honorable Lynn Ford reassume jurisdiction in Cause No. C-86-113 to conduct a summary, yet due process hearing upon the question of whether the claim in C-86-113 or any other claim of which the court has knowledge, presents a reasonable basis for disqualification. If the Court has jurisdiction of any such claim and such claim is specious and a sham and intended solely to evade court jurisdiction, it should strike such claim. If the claim has no reasonable basis, the court should not disqualify.
Id. at 752-53. The case illustrates that litigants who engage in baseless, abusive attempts to obtain a change of judge should expect those attempts to fail and may face sanctions.
Conclusion
This matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on a petition to transfer jurisdiction following the issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals. The petition was filed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 57. The Court has reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Any record on appeal that was submitted has been made available to the Court for review, along with all briefs that may have been filed in the Court of Appeals and all the materials filed in connection with the request to transfer jurisdiction. Each participating member of the Court has voted on the petition. Each participating member has had the opportunity to voice that Justice’s views on the case in conference with the other Justices.
Being duly advised, the Court DENIES the appellant’s petition to transfer jurisdiction. The Court refrains from imposing sanctions or restrictions at this point, but Mr. Zavodnik can expect any further abusive litigation practices in any judicial forum in this state to be met with appropriate sanctions and restrictions. No petition for rehearing is permitted. See App. R. 58(B).
All Justices concur.