Robb, J.
Remy contends that admission of evidence of pornographic materials found inside his home was improper character evidence prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). . . . .
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As to the State’s “grooming” rationale, this court has previously held this is a valid basis for admitting past acts under Rule 404(b). See Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In Piercefield, the court defined “grooming” as “the process of cultivating trust with a victim and gradually introducing sexual behaviors until reaching the point where it is possible to perpetrate a sex crime against the victim.” Id. at 1216 n.1 (citation and quotation marks omitted). This court held that evidence of the victim’s past massages of the defendant was relevant to show preparation, plan, and grooming, because the massages were demanded by the defendant and used to familiarize the victim with touching and having a more physical relationship with the defendant. Id. at 1216. The court emphasized, however, that this evidence was far less prejudicial than evidence of past sexual activity because the “massage contacts . . . were not criminal by themselves and were not overtly sexual.” Id.
On the spectrum of prejudice, we find this case falls somewhere between Piercefield and cases like Greenboam v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, which involved evidence of past molestations. There is no question that the pornographic images admitted by the State in this case are “overtly sexual.” Cf. Piercefield, 877 N.E.2d at 1216 (implying that evidence of acts that were “overtly sexual” would be far more prejudicial than the massages at issue in Piercefield). Additionally, we note that admission of evidence related to these images may be been evidence of other uncharged criminal conduct: Remy’s possession of at least one of the photos—an image of what appears to be an adolescent boy preparing to perform oral sex (State’s Exhibit 67)—is potentially criminal by itself to the extent it may be evidence of possession of child pornography in violation of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-4(c), and Remy’s acts of showing these pornographic images to H.B. may also have been criminal dissemination of matter harmful to minors under Indiana Code section 35-49-3-3. Cf. Piercefield, 877 N.E.2d at 1216 (implying that evidence of acts that were “criminal by themselves” would be far more prejudicial than the massages at issue in Piercefield). Because the challenged evidence is overtly sexual and is potentially evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, we find evidence of these images carries a significant danger of unfair prejudice.
As to the relevance of the pornography as evidence of grooming, we note that the record is unclear as to precisely when these images were shown to H.B. Thus, their probative value is further diminished by the fact that we cannot say with any certainty that the pornography was used to groom H.B. in preparation for a sex act yet to be committed.
Because the danger of unfair prejudice accompanying the admission of these pornographic images substantially outweighs their probative value, we conclude the trial court erred by admitting the vast majority of these images. Given our standard of review, the fact that Remy showed the image involving saran wrap and oral sex to H.B., and the image’s strong parallel to one of the charged acts, we would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 68. However, the remainder of the challenged images should not have been admitted at trial.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.