Riley, J.
On October 10, 2013, the trial court issued an Order granting the State’s Motion to Withdraw from Plea Agreement. By refusing to testify at his co-defendant’s trial, the trial court found that Campbell had breached a provision “of substance” and was not entitled to receive the benefit of being sentenced in accordance with the Plea Agreement. (Appellant’s App. p. 471). Accordingly, the trial court vacated Campbell’s judgment of conviction and ordered the case to proceed to trial as originally charged.
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Campbell, the State, and the trial court are in agreement that Indiana courts have not yet decided this precise situation. Thus, Campbell relies on firmly established case law that holds the State may only withdraw from a plea agreement prior to the trial court’s acceptance, as long as the defendant has not relied to his detriment on the plea agreement and the State has not materially benefitted from the deal. See Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Because the trial court had already accepted the Plea Agreement and entered a judgment of conviction at the time of the breach, Campbell contends that the trial court had no authority to rescind the Plea Agreement. Rather, Campbell maintains that the trial court was obligated to enforce the Plea Agreement by imposing a sentence in accordance with its terms. We disagree.
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In this case, the language of the Plea Agreement unequivocally requires Campbell to “voluntarily and completely testify at any proceeding” concerning the robbery and murder of Sekse. (Appellant’s App. p. 313). It is undisputed that Campbell refused to testify when called upon by the State at his co-defendant’s trial. While the Plea Agreement explicitly provides that if Campbell appeals either his judgment or sentence, the deal will be considered repudiated and the State may reinstate all nine charges, it does not include any such specific remedy for his refusal to testify. See, e.g., Spivey v. State, 553 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding plea agreement was void based on defendant’s refusal to provide truthful information where provision specified that defendant’s deception would annul the deal). Nevertheless, we must presume that the parties included each provision in the Plea Agreement for a purpose. Ind. Gaming Co. v. Blevins, 724 N.E.2d 274, 278-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. We find that the provision obligating Campbell to testify in his co-defendants’ trials would be rendered meaningless if Campbell could unilaterally break the Plea Agreement after acceptance by the trial court and still receive the same benefits as if he had fully performed.
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. . . [W]e find that by refusing to testify at his co-defendant’s trial, Campbell failed to tender the consideration specifically contemplated in the Plea Agreement. Griffin, 756 N.E.2d at 575. Thus, we agree with the trial court that it would deprive the State of its end of the bargain to sentence Campbell in accordance with a contract that he did not fully satisfy. Moreover, as it was Campbell—not the State—who breached the Plea Agreement, we find little merit in Campbell’s argument that the State’s real motive for withdrawing was due to its realization that it had “made a bad deal” after Campbell’s co-defendant received a ninety-year sentence. . . . .
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While a defendant’s breach of a plea agreement does not give rise to the same due process concerns that permit a defendant’s withdrawal from a plea deal that the State has breached, our court has recognized “that to permit a defendant to enter a plea bargain binding on the court and thereafter retain the benefit of the bargain, while relieving himself of his burden, would operate as a fraud upon the court.” Spivey, 553 N.E.2d at 509. Furthermore, public policy considerations support the determination that the State should have the same opportunities as a defendant to seek redress in the event of a defendant’s breach of a plea agreement. Plea agreements are a valuable tool to the administration of justice because pre-trial disposition of criminal charges “facilitate[s] the essential conservation of limited judicial and prosecutorial resources.” Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ind. 1986). A public perception that prosecutors will renege on plea deals could “impair[] the reliability and usefulness” of plea agreements. Id. Similarly, to find that Campbell has the prerogative to purposefully violate a provision of his Plea Agreement “and consequently benefit himself . . . would greatly diminish the usefulness and finality of plea agreements as parties would not be able to rely upon them.” Downs v. State, 827 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
. . . If we were to adopt Campbell’s argument that upon the trial court’s acceptance of a plea agreement, the State may not withdraw under any circumstances and the trial court must proceed directly to sentencing, the floodgates would be thrown wide open for criminal defendants to make duplicitous promises to prosecutors in order to reduce their own penal exposure, knowing that their negotiated sentences would be preserved regardless of their non-compliance. Such a holding would “undermine the integrity and credibility of the criminal justice system.” Id. Accordingly, even though the trial court had already accepted the Plea Agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, we conclude that Campbell’s subsequent breach warranted the State’s withdrawal from the Plea Agreement prior to the imposition of any sentence.
MATHIAS, J. and CRONE, J. concur.