Najam, J.
Hall first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded from the evidence the transcript of a phone call between A.D. [the alleged victim M.T.’s mother] and Hall [the defendant and A.D.’s former boyfriend], where A.D. had provided Hall with information he could use to impeach M.T. The phone call included the following relevant excerpt:
Hall: I’m sittin’ here talkin’ to my peoples and stuff, and I’m tryin’ to, like write everything down that you was sayin’ to get my little portfolio strong. And I mean, so give me back all, all of the evidence for, against [M.T.] to make her little statements uncredible [sic]. All that s**t that you was tellin’ me about that happened in Kentucky, and all the other little s**t. Talk to me, baby, so I can write this s**t down.
A.D.: . . . [An attorney] was sayin’ that you know basically a rape case is [unintelligible] word against word even if there’s no evidence. So what you gotta do is like we had already talked about provin’ somebody was [unintelligible] reliable. That’s what we need to focus on. So gosh, I don’t even know where to start.
. . . .
Hall: Alright. Alright, so tell me about this stuff that happened in Kentucky?
A.D.: When she said some boys like touched her?
Hall: She said some boy did something to her.
A.D.: Yeah, and it came, found out that it was like a mutual thing. They were experimentin’ on one another.
Hall: And she tried to get him locked up for like. . .
A.D.: He was just a little kid. He was her age.
Hall: Oh. He was her age.
A.D.: It wasn’t like [unintelligible] an adult or nothin’ like that. But I mean still, it’s the same f***in’ situation.
Hall: Yeah, but she lied and said the little boy did somethin’ to her and come to find out, that s**t wasn’t even true.
. . . .
Def.’s Ex. C. [Footnote omitted]
Hall maintains that, while the phone call between Hall and A.D. regarding M.T.’s lack of credibility was excluded by the trial court’s order in limine prohibiting “[a]ny questions, testimony, evidence, or comments concerning any specific acts of dishonesty by any State’s witness,” Appellant’s App. at 149, the State opened the door to that evidence through its questioning of A.D. and Hall. . . . .
Here, Hall contends that the State’s questioning of A.D. and Hall regarding their phone call left the jury with a false impression that Hall had been grasping for straws and had a bad motive when he asked A.D. for information he could use to impeach M.T. In fact, A.D. had previously given such information to Hall, and she repeated that information to Hall during the phone call.
In support of his contention on this issue, Hall directs us to the following colloquy during the State’s direct examination of A.D.:
Q: What did [Hall] say to you?
A: He wanted to know information about M.T. that could clear his name.
Q: How do you mean?
A: He wanted to know about anything in M.T.’s past, medical records, anything that he could use to get out of his case.
Tr. at 164. And on cross-examination of A.D., the following colloquy occurred:
Q: And when you were asked about a conversation you had with Mr. Hall when he wanted you to help clear his name, do recall talking about that? Did you actually give him information?
A: Did I physically give him anything? No.
Q: No, did you—because you were having a conversation. Did you give him any information?
STATE: Objection; hearsay. It’s not . . .
COURT: Response?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m asking her if she gave information. I don’t believe that I’m asking for an out of court statement to prove the truth of anything.
COURT: Alright. Objection is overruled.
* * *
A: His request, no. I didn’t give him any information.
* * *
Q: Is it your testimony here today that that conversation where he wanted to clear his name was one and done, he made a request and you gave him no information and that was the end of the conversation?
A: He asked me questions. He basically said, give me information . . .
Tr. at 196-99 (emphasis added).
At that point, the cross-examination stopped and the trial court conducted a lengthy sidebar conference after excusing the jury. The parties discussed the risk that, in answering the question, A.D. would “go afoul” of the trial court’s order in limine excluding “[a]ny questions, testimony, evidence, or comments concerning any specific acts of dishonesty by any State’s witness.” Appellant’s App. at 149. In the course of the sidebar conference, the trial court listened to the recording of the phone call. The trial court ultimately ruled that A.D.’s statements made during the phone call were inadmissible. And defense counsel did not repeat his question to A.D. about whether she had given Hall any information. The trial court then warned the State to keep in mind if you ask questions on redirect that expand on [the phone call], that does in a sense open the door to things that have not been opened at this point in time which would allow all that to be played. Because [defense counsel’s] not asking that question again, nor is he going to refer to it again. Tr. at 222.
Nevertheless, on cross-examination of Hall the State questioned him about the phone call with A.D. The following colloquy occurred:
. . .
Q: Okay. And after [exchanging hellos,] you told A.D. that you were attempting to get, quote, your little portfolio together, end quote, for your people, whoever they may be, I don’t know, to get your things ready for this, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were talking about this case.
A: Yes.
Q: And then immediately thereafter you—paraphrasing your view, correct me if I’m wrong, you asked A.D. to give you anything in which you could attack the twelve-year-old’s credibility with, is that right?
A: She had already told me—
Q: Hold on Mr. Hall. I asked you a specific question, yes or no.
A: I asked her to give me what she gave me.
Q: I—you asked her—
A: Tell me what you told me, that’s what I—
Q: You asked her to give you whatever you needed to attack the twelve-year-old’s credibility, isn’t that right, yes or no, Mr. Hall? Remember the Court’s order, yes or no.
A: Yes.
Tr. at 592-93 (emphases added). Then, on re-re-direct examination, defense counsel asked Hall, “in reference to the question the State asked about that conversation with A.D., where you asked A.D. to give you back information—” Id. at 594. But the State objected before defense counsel could finish the question. Following a sidebar conference, [footnote omitted] the trial court sustained the objection as “outside the scope of the State’s question” on cross-examination. Id. at 595.
We agree with Hall that the State opened the door to the admissibility of the phone call. The State’s cross-examination of Hall insinuated that he had no basis for asking A.D. questions about M.T.’s credibility, that he had a bad motive in asking those questions, and that his request for information was for naught, all of which was untrue. When the trial court ruled that A.D.’s statements made during the phone call were inadmissible, Hall was denied the opportunity to demonstrate to the jury that A.D. had, in fact, given Hall information relevant to A.D.’s credibility. Indeed, A.D. was allowed not only to stonewall but to give false testimony when she testified that, “I didn’t give [Hall] any information.” Id. at 199. In essence, the State used the phone call as a sword to attack Hall’s credibility, while it simultaneously used the motion in limine as a shield to immunize A.D. from cross-examination, to bolster A.D.’s false testimony, which went to her credibility, and to keep Hall from answering questions to rebut the State’s attack. The State cannot have it four ways. The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the proffered evidence. [Footnote omitted.]
. . . .
Finally, Hall contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to compel A.D. to answer a deposition question about an alleged prior false accusation of sexual misconduct made by M.T., namely, the Kentucky incident mentioned by A.D. in her recorded phone call with Hall. In Walton v. State, 715 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ind. 1999), our supreme court held as follows:
. . . Accordingly, the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question—including Indiana cases decided before the adoption of the Rules of Evidence—have held that the evidentiary rule preventing evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness must yield to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and right to present a full defense.[] Finding both the reasoning and weight of this authority persuasive, we hold that evidence of prior false accusations of rape is admissible to attack the credibility of the accusing witness, notwithstanding the general exclusionary edict of [Evidence] Rule 608(b).
(Alteration and footnote omitted). And the court further held that evidence of prior false accusations of rape may be admitted if (1) the complaining witness admits he or she made a prior false accusation of rape; or (2) the prior accusation is demonstrably false. Id. at 828. While the holding in Walton refers to prior false accusations of rape specifically, our supreme court relied in relevant part on Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), where we held that “evidence of false accusations of similar sexual misconduct is admissible on the issue of the victim’s credibility.” (Emphasis added). The Walton holding is not limited to prior false accusations of rape but also includes prior false accusations of similar sexual misconduct.
Hall maintains that, according to A.D., M.T. had made a prior false accusation of sexual misconduct, which would be relevant to M.T.’s credibility and admissible as an exception to Evidence Rule 608(b) under Walton. While A.D. was general in her remarks to Hall in the phone call, she stated that M.T. had “lied and said [a] little boy did somethin’ to her and come to find out, that s**t wasn’t even true.” Def.’s Ex. C. And A.D. told Hall that it was the “same situation” as Hall’s situation. [Footnote omitted.] Id. But, when she was later deposed by Hall’s counsel, A.D. refused to discuss the incident in detail, and Hall moved to compel her to answer his request for more specific information, which the trial court denied.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Hall’s motion to compel. [Footnote omitted.] . . . A.D. did not assert that the information sought was privileged or subject to protection, and it was clearly relevant to Hall’s defense in that it bears directly on M.T.’s credibility. See Ind. Trial Rule 26(B). On remand, the trial court shall grant Hall’s motion to compel.
We note that, during Hall’s offer of proof on this issue, the trial court apparently misunderstood Hall’s argument with regard to the potential admissibility of the evidence sought in his motion to compel. The trial court found that, unless Hall was willing to admit that he and M.T. had had consensual sex, then the incident in Kentucky was not similar to M.T.’s claims against Hall. In particular, the following colloquy occurred:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: She also said it’s the same situation as this—
COURT: Except it wasn’t—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: —the same situation—
COURT: —the same situation as this. She said that that was consensual. Unless you’re ready to claim that this situation actually happened and it was consensual, it’s not the same situation.
Tr. at 476-77. And the court went on to conclude that the purported evidence did not even suggest that a prior false accusation had been made:
COURT: But there wasn’t –but here’s what I’m saying: There was sexual conduct in that particular case. I mean, she says it here that there was something with a boy. It wasn’t a false allegation. And again, you have to show that the false allegation is true—I mean, I understand it’s sort of a circular argument, but it’s true—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge—
COURT: —you can’t get past the rape shield [statute] without showing there’s a false allegation and what you’re showing me, at least the evidence presented here is that it wasn’t truly a false allegation. Something did occur—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But the accusation—
COURT: —which is past sexual conduct which is barred by the Rape Shield [Act].
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The allegation could have been of rape, not consensual sexual conduct and that would have been a false statement according to the—
COURT: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: —to the tape and Judge, again, if we would have been able to inquire further into this after the deposition we would not even have this situation right now but we were barred from doing so.
Id. at 478-79 (emphases added).
Contrary to the trial court’s analysis, A.D.’s statements in her phone call with Hall indicate that M.T. had made a prior false allegation of sexual misconduct which may, depending on the evidence obtained through further discovery, be admissible under. [Footnote omitted.] No Indiana court has addressed the “similar sexual misconduct” requirement under Little, but similar does not mean identical. Here, if Hall discovers evidence to confirm, for example, that M.T. had previously made a demonstrably false accusation of similar sexual misconduct, it would be admissible on the issue of M.T.’s credibility regardless of whether M.T. ultimately conceded that she engaged in a consensual sexual act with the boy in Kentucky. See id. As we stated in Little, “[t]he focus is the falsity of the accusations.” 413 N.E.2d at 643.
BROWN, J., concurs.
VAIDIK, C.J., dissents in part and concurs in part with separate opinion:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse Hall’s Class A felony child-molesting conviction. First, I agree with the majority that the trial court properly excluded the evidence of M.T.’s reputation for untruthfulness in her community and that the trial court should have granted Hall’s motion to compel A.D. to answer the deposition question about M.T.’s alleged prior false allegation of sexual misconduct with a boy in Kentucky. However, I disagree that the contents of A.D.’s entire phone call with Hall should be admitted. In any event, I believe that any error by the trial court in excluding the phone call was harmless and would therefore affirm Hall’s conviction for Class A felony child molesting.