Riley, J.
Gyamfi contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony and evidence which was derivatively gained as a result of information or leads obtained during the unlawful search and seizure in Boone County. Gyamfi maintains that the receipt establishing the Hancock County Transaction was discovered during Officer Harves’ search of Gyamfi’s vehicle. As this search was declared illegal, all evidence obtained as a result thereof becomes fruit of the poisonous tree, and its admission by the trial court violated Gyamfi’s rights pursuant to Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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First, the State asserts that the disputed evidence was found by means sufficiently distinguishable so as to be purged of the primary taint of illegality. Specifically, the State maintains that no evidence of Officer Harves’ initial and illegal search was admitted; rather, the State contends that all evidence admitted “was found pursuant to Detective Ralston’s independent investigation.” (State’s Br. p. 15).
We agree that not all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree and subject to suppression simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal police activity. Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where the connection between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Specifically, “[i]n some situations, the causal chain is sufficiently attenuated to dissipate any taint of [the illegal police activity], allowing the evidence seized during a search to be admitted.” Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). This is known as the attenuation doctrine.
However, in Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), we concluded that “the attenuation doctrine as it currently exists as a separate analysis to circumvent the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment purposes has no application under the Indiana Constitution.” . . . .
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Next, the State relies on the inevitable discovery doctrine when it contends that the fraud would eventually have been discovered. . . . .
Under the Fourth Amendment, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule “permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located had there been no error, for in that instance ‘there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint.’” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. However, the inevitable discovery exception has not been adopted as a matter of Indiana Constitutional law. Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Our supreme court has previously held that “our state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a result of [an unconstitutional] search be suppressed.” Shultz, 742 N.E.2d at 965 (quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1995)). Despite the State’s request, we are not inclined to adopt the inevitable discovery rule as part of Indiana constitutional law in light of our supreme court’s firm language. See Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 935. Accordingly, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not available to validate the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search.
In sum, because the contested evidence was obtained as an immediate result of Officer Harves’ illegal search and seizure, the evidence amounted to fruit of the poisonous tree and the trial court abused its discretion by its admittance pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. . . . .
ROBB, J. concurs and concurs with Bradford, J. concurring in part, concurring in result separate opinion.
BRADFORD, J. concurs in part and concurs in result with separate opinion:
I concur with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, i.e., the security tape from the Speedway store located in Greenfield, at trial. However, I write separately to reiterate that I believe that the inevitable discovery rule could apply under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution if the State were to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence would have been discovered but for the unlawful search. The State, however, failed to do so here.